Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 26

Issue 2

Article 3

2018

Privacy vs. Protection: Why Tracking Mobile-device Location Data
Without a Warrant Requires a Fourth Amendment Exception
Andrew Stover
Michigan State University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth Amendment
Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew Stover, Privacy vs. Protection: Why Tracking Mobile-device Location Data Without a Warrant
Requires a Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 Cath. U. J. L. & Tech 1 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt/vol26/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

PRIVACY VS. PROTECTION: WHY
TRACKING MOBILE-DEVICE LOCATION
DATA WITHOUT A WARRANT REQUIRES A
FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTION
Andrew J. Stover+

“For time and the world do not stand still. Change is the law of life. And
those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future.”1
– John F. Kennedy
Imagine an America where the police and government were able to determine
where people have been, or even where they currently are, just by looking at
their mobile-device. An America where the government tracks the places one
travels without limit; an America eerily reminiscent of George Orwell’s 1984.2
That America could be fast approaching based on recent legal rulings.3 If left
unchecked, modern America may become fictional Oceania.4
On May 31, 2016, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals joined the Fifth, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits in ruling that law enforcement’s requests for mobiledevice data records from service providers are not searches under the Fourth
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2015, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 2018, Michigan State University
College of Law.
John F. Kennedy, Address in the Assembly Hall at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt (June 25,
1963).
2
See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 at 5 (Signet Classic 1961) (“[T]he eyes follow you about
when you move. Big Brother Is Watching You.”).
3
See id. at 6 (“[A] helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant
like a blue-bottle and darted away again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol,
snooping into people’s windows.”); see e.g., State v. Tate, 849 N.W.2d 798, 805–806 (Wis.
2014) (reasoning how a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when
one “is traveling down a public highway.”).
4
See ORWELL, supra note 2, at 7 (“Winston kept his back turned to the telescreen. It
was safer; though as he well knew, even a back can be revealing.”).
1
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Amendment and thus do not require a warrant.5 While circuits to hear cases on
this issue may all be in agreement, lower federal courts outside of those circuits’
jurisdictions are not so united.6 No circuit yet to rule on the issue controls a
jurisdiction in which a district court has ruled in favor of privacy rights.7
Although this particular issue is novel due to the growing use of mobile devices
and Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking, it is part of a family of issues
that have been proceeding through the courts since the turn of the century.8
Scholarship on tracking mobile-device location data has focused on the
increased use of such data by law enforcement to deduce suspects’ physical

5
See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1018 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding the
search of “an individual’s location (or a cell phone’s location), so long as the tracking does
not reveal movements within the home (or hotel room), does not cross the sacred threshold
of the home” and does not violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d
498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (reasoning the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy because when he registered his phone with the carrier, he voluntarily provided his
personal information); In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data,
724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that compelling “cell phone service providers to
produce the historical cell site information of their subscribers [were not] per se
unconstitutional.”); see also Jenna McLaughlin, Appeals Court Delivers Devastating Blow
to Cellphone-Privacy Advocates, INTERCEPT (May 31, 2016),
https://theintercept.com/2016/05/31/appeals-court-delivers-devastating-blow-to-cell-phoneprivacy-advocates/; No warrant needed to get cell phone location: US court, PHYS.ORG
(May 31, 2016), http://phys.org/news/2016-05-warrant-cell-court.html (explaining
individuals who “voluntarily disclosed to a third party” and in those cases, “cell phone users
‘voluntarily’ give that data to carriers whenever they make a call or send a text message”
and have no expectation of privacy).
6
See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding the
defendants “assumed the risk” when the phone company turned over the defendants’ cell
phone information); In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1039, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2015); United States v. Lambis,
744 F. Supp. 3d 606, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 507, 511 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc);
United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Skinner, 690
F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012).
8
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (holding that police generally
cannot search the contents of an arrested person’s cell phone without a warrant); United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2010) (holding that attaching GPS devices to cars
constitutes a search that requires a warrant). See generally Naomi LaChance, At Supreme
Court, Debate Over Phone Privacy Has A Long History, NPR (Mar. 8, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/02/29/468609371/at-supreme-courtdebate-over-phone-privacy-has-a-long-history (explaining, for example, the Supreme Court
has unanimously held attaching GPS devices to cars constitutes a search that requires a
warrant); Alex Alben, How to protect privacy in the digital age: a constitutional
amendment, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/how-toprotect-privacy-in-the-digital-age-a-constitutional-amendment/ (proposing for a new
amendment to “safeguard privacy as a first principle of American law,” given that
“widespread deployment of GPS . . . our digital footprints are tracked and recorded.”).
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locations, usually without a warrant.9 As is often the case, scholarship is divided
as to the legality of law enforcement’s compelling companies to disclose
records—without a warrant—in order to track a suspect.10 On one side is
scholarship that recognizes the need for law enforcement to protect the general
public, which agrees with the circuits that such information retrieval is not a
search under the Fourth Amendment.11 On the other side is scholarship that
emphatically argues such use of mobile-device location data is a search and—
without a warrant—is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.12 Some
scholarship advocates for an approach from both the judiciary and society
towards being more informed and not simply applying “blind justice,” which is
to say refraining from making gut reactions and uninformed decisions by taking
into account data and evidence.13
This Comment advocates for the recognition of a new exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement. Law enforcement’s tactic of arresting
suspects by using location tracking data, obtained by compelling service

9
Martin Dolan, Noreen Lennon & Karen Munoz, Use of Cell Phone Records and GPS
Tracking, 24 CBA REC. 38, 39 (2010); see, e.g., Brian L. Owsley, Cell Phone Tracking in
the Era of United States v. Jones and Riley v. California, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 207, 227
(2015) (stating, under the third-party doctrine, mobile device users do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy to their location data); Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain
Sight: A Fourth Amendment Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public,
66 EMORY L.J. 527, 535 (2017).
10 Compare Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 41
(2013), with Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 715 (2011) (explaining how law
enforcement can compel companies to turn over various phone data as permissible while
others contend the constitutional implications of obtaining public data).
11 RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE (2014) (noting the third-party doctrine and
compulsion of location data can be harmonized with Fourth Amendment case law); see, e.g.,
William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 885
(1991) (suggesting law enforcement should be able to search without a warrant because
“[t]he reasons for requiring warrants are genuine, but not strong; it is entirely plausible that
the system would function better without them.”).
12 See Alessandra Suuberg, Big Foot, Big Brother . . . and a Big Step Backwards for
Your Fourth Amendment Rights: The Sixth Circuit Approves Warrantless Cell Phone
Tracking in United States v. Skinner, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 319, 330 (2012); see
also Ian Herbert, Where We Are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology
and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 442,
448 (2011) (explaining GPS can “reveal the target’s location every second of every day,
while others only provide information when asked.”).
13 Baradaran, supra note 10, at 3–4 (“Blind balancing” is “the process of decision
making based simply on common sense and a gut assessment of risk, without consideration
of data, evidence, or empirical studies” and ensures “important privacy rights enshrined in
the Fourth Amendment are protected by individuals who are seen as criminals in the eyes of
the court . . . [B]ecause the harmed party is identified as a criminal at the outset, the balance
starts skewed in favor of the government.”).
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providers to disclose users’ mobile-device information, may constitute a
“search,” yet it may be a “search” that is not unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.14 The Supreme Court, due to recent lower court rulings, should
take up the issue and create a new exception to the warrant requirement that
protects privacy interests in electronic data contained on one’s mobile device.15
This exception must recognize a presumption of privacy in mobile devices, thus
making it a search requiring a warrant to obtain location data.16 The exception
would then balance citizens’ privacy interests against governmental interests,
requiring the government to overcome the presumption of privacy through a
strong showing of need.17
Part I discusses the evolving history of mobile devices in the United States,
beginning with the rise of mobile devices, data networks, and modern “smart
phones,” and gives a general overview of differing approaches to location data
protections.18 Part II provides an overview of federal court jurisprudence on the
issue of whether police’s obtaining location data records without a warrant is an
unconstitutional search.19 Part III offers an overview of Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding similar issues pertaining to location tracking and data
privacy.20 Part IV analyzes how such uses of location tracking data by law
enforcement are unconstitutional searches when conducted without a warrant in
14 See Jeremy H. Rothstein, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of
Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 530 (2012) (explaining
how cell phone users “voluntarily disclose their location to third parties merely by carrying
a cell phone that can be tracked with GPS.”); e.g., Charles Blain, Police Could Get Your
Data Location Without A Warrant. That Has To End, WIRED (Feb. 2, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/police-get-location-data-without-warrant-end/ (describing
how the victim was able to receive a restraining order because the defendant stalked her
using his cell phone).
15 See, e.g., David Smith, Supreme court considers limits on police tracking via mobile
phone data, GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2017, 4:45 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/nov/29/supreme-court-considers-limits-on-policetracking-via-mobile-phone-data (discussing the implications of the government relying on a
1979 Supreme Court decision that distinguished between phone records and the actual
conversations in this modern era).
16 See Henry F. Fradella, Weston J. Morrow, Ryan G. Fischer & Connie Ireland,
Quantifying Katz: Empirically Measuring Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the Fourth
Amendment Context, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 289, 311 (2011) (arguing that the technological
advancements of this era calls for updated outlooks of constitutional privacy concerns).
17 See, e.g., Glenn Chatmas Smith, We’ve Got Your Number (Is it Constitutional to Give
It Out): Caller Identification Technology and the Right to Informational Privacy, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 145, 199 (1989); see also Suuberg, supra note 12, at 330 (explaining how many
entities criticized United States v. Skinner because it denies “an expectation of privacy in
cell phones.”).
18 Infra Part I.
19 Infra Part II.
20 Infra Part III.
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certain instances, but not others, and how the proposed exception would
operate.21
I. EVOLVING HISTORY OF A MOBILE NETWORK SOCIETY
Over the past forty-three years, the United States has become increasingly
reliant on mobile devices.22 In under two generations, mobile technology has
boomed, with over 64% of American adults owning a smartphone.23 With the
rise of mobile-device usage the ability of law enforcement to use such devices
as a tool to track suspects has also risen.24 The prevalence of mobile devices in
everyday life has led to approaches for tracking location data,25 ranging from
allowing police to track without a warrant26 to requiring police to obtain a
warrant before tracking.27 The issue of tracking suspects through their location

Infra Part IV.
See Freiwald, supra note 10, at 681, 702 (explaining location data provides law
enforcement information about an individual’s arrival and departure time and from where);
see also Ellen Gibson, Smartphone dependency: a growing obsession with gadgets, USA
TODAY (July 7, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/medical/health/medical/
mentalhealth/story/2011/07/Smartphone-dependency-a-growing-obsession-togadgets/49661286/1 (remarking that added dependence on mobile devices comes as
Americans choose mobile phones over iPods, cameras, maps, and address books).
23 Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/; see also Blain, supra
note 14 (“[O]n average, American millennials check their phone roughly 82 times a day.”).
24 See, e.g., Mara Van Ells, Law enforcement officers use cellphone tracking as a tool,
BISMARCK TRIB. (May 26, 2012), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/law-enforcem…racking-as-a-tool/article_23531016-a5c1-11e1-a9570019bb2963f4.html (explaining how “cellphone information is a very useful tool for law
enforcement and prosecutors.”); cf. Jamie Condliffe, Warrantless Tracking of Phone
Location Data Could Get Harder, MIT TECH. REV. (June 6, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608042/warrantless-tracking-of-cell-phone-locationdata-by-the-police-could-get-harder (tracking criminals could prove to be difficult despite
the advent of cell phone use).
25 See, e.g., Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/map/cell-phone-location-tracking-laws-state (last visited May 24,
2018); Charles Arthur, iPhone keeps record of everywhere you go, GUARDIAN (Apr. 20,
2011, 9:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/apr/20/iphone-trackingprompts-privacy-fears (“Apple’s iPhone keep track of where you go – and saves every detail
of it to a secret file on the device which is then copied to the owner’s computer when the
two are synchronised [sic].”).
26 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774, 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the defendant “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data and
location on his cell phone.”).
27 See Pub. Act 098-1104, § 10 ILL. GEN. ASSEMB. (Ill. 2014) (“[A] law enforcement
agency shall not obtain current or future location information pertaining to a person or his or
her effects without first obtaining a court order based on probable cause.”); see Skinner, 690
F.3d at 774, 777, 781.
21
22
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data is one that continues to grow and sow disagreement.28
A. Overview of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: A Primer
The Fourth Amendment is one of the most zealously coveted and protected
parts of the United States Constitution.29 It guarantees the right of Americans,
“the people,” to be free from searches of their homes, personal effects, and body,
as well as seizure of their persons and property by the government without
reasonable grounds.30 Additionally, before the government may search or seize
it must obtain a warrant, which is based on probable cause supported by
statements, or evidence that describes the place being searched and the people
or items being seized.31
One of the more important aspects of the Fourth Amendment is the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” inquiry,32 which is both a legal standard33
and a constitutional safeguard.34 As formulated by Justice Harlan’s concurrence
in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the existence of reasonable
expectations of privacy in persons, places, and objects are determined using a
two-part test.35 That test has been applied for the past fifty years by United States
courts to determine whether privacy rights attach to Americans’ interactions,
possessions, technologies, living quarters, and countless other areas.36
28 See, e.g., Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (explaining
how “the status of your privacy protections depends on where you are. For example, your
location information is protected in Montana, but not in Georgia.”).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Barry Friedman & Orin Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CENT., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/amendments/amendment-iv (last visited May 24, 2018) (understanding the
Fourth Amendment “places restraints on the government any time it detains (seizes) or
searches a person or property.”).
30 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31 See id.; see, e.g., Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A
reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a
place contains specific items connected with a crime.”).
32 Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 n.3 (2012) (explaining how the
Fourth Amendment values one’s property rights and when the Government installs a GPS
on a vehicle, they have physically intruded on a constitutionally protected area).
33 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (1967).
34 Id. (stating the infamous legal standard that there are places and objects in which a
person has “a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”). Cf. Jones, 565
U.S. at 404–05 n.3.
35 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining Justice Harlan’s test
comprised an inquiry into (1) whether the person exhibited an actual expectation of privacy,
and (2) whether society recognizes the expectation as reasonable).
36 Cf. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7, 9–10 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 32, 35 (2001); United States v. Padin, 787 F.2d 1071, 1076 (6th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Cabrera, No. 11–117–GMS, 2014 WL 3540894, at *14 (D. Del. July 15, 2014). In
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The newest frontier for the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable expectation of
privacy inquiry is that of mobile-device user data.37 Courts have been grappling
with whether citizens have privacy rights to their data and whether those rights
rise to the level of protection granted in Katz.38 Even the Supreme Court has
entered the fray, weighing in on the constitutionality of warrantless searches of
cell phone videos and images, GPS tracking devices on cars, and pen registers
on home phones.39 Yet until recently, the Court has declined to address the issue
of warrantless tracking of location data by law enforcement.40 That decision,
expected sometime in 2018, could definitively determine whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to citizens’ mobile device data.41
B. The Rise of Technology (GPS and Data) in the United States
Technology has quickly become present in almost every facet of American
life, spurring a revolution of new portable devices that rely on mobile networks,
which constantly communicate location data to service providers.42 While the
mobile-device may now be an everyday norm, it elicited ridicule when first
released.43 History proved even the most astute experts to be sensationally
fact, as of May 23, 2018, Katz has been cited 12,314 times by courts in the United States.
Citing References for Katz v. United States, Westlaw KeyCite,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/RelatedInformation/I64df71169c1d11d9bc61beebb95be672/kcC
itingReferences.html?docSource=57694273439b4fb49d17ae3493cb2634&pageNumber=1&
facetGuid=h562dbc1f9a5f4b0c9e54031a19076b9c&transitionType=ListViewType&context
Data=(sc.DocLink) (search Katz v. United States; then click on the case; then click Citing
References on menu bar and choose cases from the menu on the left).
37 See, e.g., Jeremy Fogel, From the Bench: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy,
LITIG. J., Spring 2014, at 1.
38 Cf. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1351, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); United States v. Pierre, 435 Fed. Appx. 905, 908 (11th Cir. 2011).
39 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–90 (2014) (reasoning that searching a
phone’s physical properties to determine danger is different from searching a phone’s
internal data, with the latter being unconstitutional without a warrant); United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408–09 (2012) (holding that GPS tracking devices attached to vehicles
outside the scope of a warrant are unconstitutional); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742
(1979) (ruling that there is no expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from a home
phones owned by the service provider).
40 See Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court to Settle Major Cellphone Privacy Case,
REUTERS (June 5, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-mobilephoneidUSKBN18W1RY (explaining, in technology and criminal law cases, the Supreme Court
has ruled that “a warrant is required to place a GPS tracking device on a vehicle” and
“police need a warrant to search a cellphone that is seized during an arrest.”).
41 See Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85
U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402).
42 See Gibson, supra note 22 (remarking that added dependence on mobile devices
comes as Americans choose mobile phones over iPods, cameras, maps, and address books).
43 See Will Oremus, Forty Years Ago Today, Snarky Tech Journalists Made Fun of the
First Cellphone, FUTURE TENSE (Apr. 3, 2013, 2:10 PM), www.slate.com/blogs/
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incorrect.44
That original device, the Motorola DynaTAC, had a battery that could last up
to eight hours.45 Jumping to 1993, Bellsouth and IBM released the “Simon
personal communicator phone,” which was touted as the first “smartphone.”46
In 2002, the next generation of technologically advanced smartphones was
released into the market.47 The world’s first modern smartphone was born in
2007 with the release of the iPhone, Apple’s venture into the mobile device
market after previously concentrating on its Mac computers.48 In the product
release, Apple claimed the iPhone was three devices rolled into one: an iPod, a
mobile phone, and a wireless communication device.49
With the dependency of Americans on mobile devices, and especially cellular
devices, law enforcement has had to adapt and apply new approaches in response
to the technology.50 Service providers are able to assist law enforcement in
future_tense/2013/04/03/cell_phones_40th_birthday_skeptics_made_fun_of_first_mobile_p
hone.html (describing how Associated Press journalists compared the release of the first cell
phone to the fictions in television series and while cellphones were too expensive for the
average consumer, only 13% of the American business community would have been
interested in purchasing such a device at that time).
44 Cf. Gibson, supra note 22 (providing that dependence on cell phones have increased
in society as relevance to perform daily tasks like shopping have become more prevalent);
Smith, supra note 23.
45 Oremus, supra note 43. Upon releasing its product, Motorola quipped that in its
opinion, people would continue using their car phones and cell phones would not replace
standard telephones. See Gibson, supra note 22.
46 See Doug Aamoth, First Smartphone Turns 20: Fun Facts About Simon, TIME (Aug.
18, 2014), http://time.com/3137005/first-smartphone-ibm-simon/ (describing that The
Simon was designed as a phone first and computer second and demanded a $900 price on
average with Bellsouth for features such as e-mail, on-screen writing (with a stylus), keypad
with letters and numbers, and a calendar).
47 See 5 major moments in cellphone history, CBC NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/news/
technology/5-major-moments-in-cellphone-history-1.1407352 (last updated Apr. 3, 2013)
(providing that The Nokia 7650 and the Sanyo SPC-5300, released in 2002 had the
distinction of being the next-generation of smartphones. These phones were the first to
incorporate built-in cameras, boasting large pixel color displays, user-controlled tones,
white balance, and zoom while the Nokia 7650 had a 176x208 pixel display); cf. Michael
Grothaus, iPhone 7 vs Samsung Galaxy S7: The BIG Flagship Fight Rages On, KNOW YOUR
MOBILE (July 19, 2017, 4:34 PM), http://www.knowyourmobile.com/mobile phones/appleiphone-7/23410/iphone-7-vs-samsung-galaxy-s7-edge-specs-features-price-detailed-ios-10android-n (showing the even more advanced features in smartphones of the largest
competing companies); see also iPhone 7 Display, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/
iphone-7/specs/ (last visited Mat 24, 2018) (describing the iPhone 7’s 1334 x 750 pixel
resolution, which makes the 2002 smartphones seem like ancient history).
48 5 major moments in cellphone history, supra note 47.
49 See id. (describing the iPhone’s advanced features, including a touch screen, visual
voicemail box, touchpad keyboard, photo library, and a large display for watching movies or
television).
50 See Van Ells, supra note 24 (quoting a North Dakota police officer as saying, “as

2018]

Privacy vs. Protection

9

finding citizens’ whereabouts through tracking location data.51 While such
methods of tracking suspects may not be used on a daily basis, there are times
where such methods are used without a second thought, as is the case in tracking
suspects of terrorism.52 Police favor mobile device tracking because it provides
nearly instantaneous results.53
While it may appear that law enforcement would always employ location data
tracking methods, it is much more difficult to implement such techniques.54 The
policies of large service providers, such as AT&T and Verizon, allow expert
analysts to determine if a true emergency exists55 and whether to hand over
information to police.56 Once law enforcement obtains the information, through
either compulsion or willing participation, the information can be sent to officers
every five, fifteen, or thirty minutes depending on the urgency of the
investigation.57
As the history of mobile device data, location tracking data, and Internet data
progresses, there will be a constant balancing of public interests of privacy and
government interests of security. One reason service providers may be reluctant
to turn over location data is that the public—that is, their customers—sees
mobile data as a privacy right to be protected.58 The government no longer
cellphones become more and more sophisticated . . . we see more and more cases where
they’re being used in criminal attempts and criminal types of enterprises.”).
51 See id. (stating that in 2012, a son was arrested and charged with his mother’s murder
and police were able to use cell phone tracking data provided by the cellular company to
locate the son).
52 See id. (explaining in emergency situations, child pedophilia situations, and
kidnapping situations tracking through cellular companies’ data is oft-used).
53 See id. (quoting a North Dakota police officer as saying, “[t]echnology . . . is kind of
a double-edged sword. More crimes are able to be committed since we have this technology
but at the same time, we’re able to investigate and successfully prosecute more cases
because of this technology.”).
54 See id. (explaining that police requests may be denied if the mobile provider does not
believe that the situation constitutes an emergency and in such instances, law enforcement
must obtain a warrant for the data whenever possible and otherwise hope that the situation
constitutes an emergency that convinces the mobile service provider to turn over
information willingly).
55 See Blain, supra note 14 (noting these policies are not just provided by cell phone
service providers but companies such as Amazon have denied turning over data without a
warrant where law enforcement requested such information from an Echo).
56 See Van Ells, supra note 24 (providing that without a showing by police of the
existence of a true emergency, the analyst may transfer the request for data to a director who
is responsible for determining whether to grant the request or inform the police they need a
subpoena because service providers guard their customers’ data information jealously, in
part because the information can be used by law enforcement to pinpoint the exact location
of the customer).
57 Id.
58 See Lee Rainie, The State of Privacy in Post-Snowden America, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept.
21, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/21/the-state-of-privacy-inamerica/ (finding that 74% of Americans believe it is very important they are in control of
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enjoys the support of public opinion that allowed for more invasive security
measures like the PATRIOT Act and other post-9/11 measures.59 The PATRIOT
Act, which allowed the government to increase its surveillance of Americans’
personal mobile and Internet data, was seen as a necessary protective measure
from future terror attacks after the tragedy of September 11, 2001.60
C. General Information on Cell Towers and Tracking Technology
Modern mobile devices are amazing pieces of technology, yet they cannot
function without the aid of a cell tower.61 These towers serve as conduits for all
mobile services, applications, and data emanating from mobile devices.62
Service providers place towers in a hexagon pattern to increase the total service
area and ensure that no holes in coverage exists.63 By studying data traffic across
networks in cell tower areas, carriers can determine whether there needs to be

who gets their information, and 65% say it is very important that they can control what
information is collected about them); see also Smith, supra note 23 (stating that a majority
of Americans own smartphones, which supports the proposition that privacy of these
Americans’ data is a major concern).
59 Sophia Rosenbaum, Privacy vs. Protection: Public Wrestles with What’s Most
Important, NBC NEWS (June 6, 2013, 10:01 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/
2013/06/06/18802435-privacy-vs-protection-public-wrestles-with-whats-mostimportant?lite; see The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm (last visited May 24, 2018) (describing
that the PATRIOT Act was passed in response to the 9/11 attacks).
60 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (describing that the PATRIOT Act allowed the government to intercept
communications, seize voicemail messages with warrants, and modify the law relating to
pen registers); see David W. Moore, Public Little Concerned About Patriot Act, GALLUP
(Sept. 9, 2003), http://news.gallup.com/poll/9205/public-little-concerned-about-patriotact.aspx (noting that shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the public was not as concerned
with loss of civil liberties in favor of counter-terrorism tactics and that two years later, the
trend increased in favor of civil liberties over government interference).
61 Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of
Cell Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (2013); see
MICHAEL HARRIS, HOW CELL TOWERS WORK 2 (2011), http://www.unisonsite.com/pdf/
resource-center/How%20Towers%20Work.pdf (describing that cell towers are essentially
elevated antennas that transmit and receive radio frequencies generated by mobile devices
and the wires running from the antenna to cellular carrier equipment contain the mobile
device information and wireless signals).
62 See Owsley, supra note 61, at 5 (describing that another purpose of the cell towers is
to collect information for billing purposes).
63 Robert M. Bloom & William T. Clark, Small Cells, Big Problems: The Increasing
Precision of Cell Site Location Information and the Need for Fourth Amendment
Protections, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 167, 172 (2016).
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more or fewer towers in a specific location.64 Cell towers in America run on a
radio access network that essentially comprises of the tower connecting to all
mobile devices in its range, the mobile devices sending data transmissions to the
antenna, and the antenna providing those transmissions to the service provider.65
While cell towers communicate with, and track all activities of, mobile
devices, a system of satellites provides the devices with the ability to give users
directions to destinations and tell them their precise location anywhere in the
world.66 The Global Positioning System (GPS) sends radio signals from
satellites orbiting the Earth to GPS devices that use the signals to pinpoint the
devices’ locations on the Earth’s surface.67 This advanced system allows
Americans to always know where they are in the world simply by enabling the
GPS functions on their mobile devices, which will then continuously monitor
the device’s global position.68
Mobile devices, by communicating with cell towers and using GPS
capabilities have the ability to be monitored and tracked by the government and
cellular service providers.69 Cell towers receive data communications about a
device’s activities, which are then stored in the service provider’s records.70
64 See Timothy Stapleton, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Cell
Location Data: Is the Whole More than the Sum of Its Parts, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 386
(2007) (describing that the number of cell towers is determined by how densely populated
an area is such as rural areas have less cell towers than cities); see also HARRIS, supra note
61, at 1–3 (describing that modern cell towers come in varying sizes depending on the
range required, with the largest typically covering 10 miles and the smallest covering under
250 yards and are also more frequently being camouflaged to blend into the surrounding
landscape so as not to be eyesores).
65 Justin Hill, Digital Technology and Analog Law: Cellular Location Data, the ThirdParty Doctrine, and the Law’s Need to Evolve, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 773, 777 (2017); see
also HARRIS, supra note 61, at 3–4 (describing that these technical specifications and radio
frequency transmissions are what people know as 3G, 4G, LTE, and other speeds that their
mobile devices use to function).
66 Owen Murphy, Commonwealth v. Augustine: The Supreme Judicial Court’s
Misapplication of Jurisprudence to Technology, 98 MASS. L. REV. 39, 41 (2017); GPS
Overview, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/ (last visited May 24, 2018).
67 See How GPS Works, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/multimedia/poster/ (last visited
May 24, 2018) (describing that once a GPS-enabled device receives the radio signal, it notes
the exact time of arrival and uses that information to calculate the distance from the device
to each of the system’s orbiting satellites calculates its distance from at least four satellites
using geometry to determine its exact location on Earth).
68 GPS Overview, supra note 66; How GPS Works, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/
multimedia/poster/ (last visited May 24, 2018).
69 E.g., Ann O’Neill, Tsarnaev Trial: Timeline of the Bombings, Manhunt and
Aftermath, CNN (May 15, 2015, 3:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/04/us/tsarnaevtrial-timeline/index.html (describing that the police were able to track the device of the
kidnapped student which helped to locate the path the brothers were on, and ultimately led
to their demise); The Problem with Mobile Phones, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE,
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/problem-mobile-phones (last visited May 24, 2018).
70 Shannon Jaeckel, Cell Phone Location Tracking: Reforming the Standard to Reflect
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Such incredible access to information, and near constant availability of cell
tower signals, gives Americans the ability to always have their mobile devices
up and running; however, it also allows law enforcement to track suspects by
way of those same devices, such as used by the Boston Police to find Dzhokhar
Tsarnev.71 Technology can be both a boon for societal interconnection and a
drawback for personal privacy.72
D. Different Strategies to Mobile Device Location Data Tracking Protections
Courts and legislatures have fallen behind the technological advancement of
society, and have thus been attempting to play catch-up in regulating and
protecting citizens’ rights to their technological data.73 One approach relies on
the judicial system to determine what rights citizens have in their mobile location
data.74 Another approach places upon legislatures the impetus to create laws and
statutes that outline citizen rights in the information.75 Yet another approach has
no binding authority from the courts or legislatures regarding the level of
protection citizens can expect.76
In the first strategy, case law has determined that no warrant is required for
law enforcement to obtain location-tracking data from service providers.77
Following the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 774
(6th Cir. 2012), this strategy allows police to obtain data and signals from mobile
devices without requiring a warrant to perform any tracking.78 Tracking location
data in such a manner is more efficient and uses fewer resources than a massive

Modern Privacy Expectations, 77 LA. L. REV. 143, 144 (2016).
71 O’Neill, supra note 69 (describing how Boston police officers were able to track
Tsarnaev through a phone call he made on a hostage’s mobile device, ultimately leading
them to his location and ending the manhunt).
72 See Jaeckel, supra note 70; O’Neill, supra note 69.
73 Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25.
74 Jaeckel, supra note 70, at 155.
75 United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 512 (11th Cir. 2015).
76 See Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (providing that some
states have yet to pass laws regarding this issue).
77 Id.
78 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 774, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that if a tool
used to transport contraband gives off a signal, and that signal’s location can be tracked,
police can track the signal; the court analogizes that to hold otherwise would prevent dogs
from being used to track fugitives); Catherine Crump, Appeals Court Rules Fourth
Amendment Does Not Protect Cell Phone Location Data, ACLU (Aug. 15, 2012),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/appeals-court-rules-fourth-amendment-doesnot-protect-cell-phone-location (highlighting that jurisdictions allow law enforcement to
achieve the same level of surveillance through GPS monitoring in minutes as would be
achieved through physical tailing of a suspect for numerous days).

2018]

Privacy vs. Protection

13

surveillance operation.79 Allowing warrantless tracking of mobile device
location data is the strategy with the largest group of jurisdictions to follow
similar policies.80
A second approach advocates requiring a warrant for all location information
tracking by law enforcement.81 This approach provides the highest level of
protection to citizens’ location data through legislatively enacted laws.82 One
example is the California Senate enacting the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act in 2015, partially to ensure that Californians were protected from
intrusions by law enforcement into their mobile data.83 To guarantee privacy
interests are protected, this approach allows citizens who have been targeted
inconsistent with the law to move to suppress data information or petition for
the destruction of the information.84 Requiring warrants for any location data
tracking is the most common approach today, while the second most common
approach concerns state legislatures enacting state statutes.85
Another strategy arose where state legislatures chose to enact laws in
harmony with, or above, federal court jurisprudence. Virginia is such a state that
has enacted its own legislation regarding the issue of location data tracking.86
Following the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d
421 (4th Cir. 2016), Virginia amended its state laws to weaken the protections
afforded to individuals’ mobile data.87 Virginia’s enacted law requires service
providers to disclose information to government entities whenever they obtain a
warrant, subpoena, court order, or consent of the consumer; yet it also provides
avenues for law enforcement to obtain mobile data without a warrant.88 Using
Crump, supra note 78.
See generally Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (showing
the jurisdictional differences in cell phone tracking laws).
81 Blain, supra note 14.
82 S.B. 178, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
83 Cal. Penal Code § 1546.1(a) (2017) (providing that the only ways government entities
may compel production of electronic communication is through a warrant, wiretap order,
electronic reader records order, or subpoena pursuant to established California law); S.B.
178, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (prohibiting government entities from compelling
service providers to produce electronic communication information, as well as accessing
electronic devices physically or electronically without a valid warrant).
84 Cal. Penal Code § 1546.4(a) (2017).
85 See generally Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (showing
the jurisdictional differences in cell phone tracking laws).
86 VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017) (providing that law enforcement may obtain
real-time location data without a warrant in certain emergencies).
87 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding the government
did not violate the Fourth Amendment by obtaining location information from a service
provider without a warrant); VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017) (providing that law
enforcement may obtain real-time location data without a warrant in certain emergencies).
88 VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017) (providing a warrant exception for certain
exigent circumstances).
79
80
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this approach, jurisdictions have amended their laws to either comply with
guidelines handed down by the circuit courts or to provide other distinctive
protections.89
A contrary state-based approach advocates enacting laws that prohibit police
from obtaining current or future location information relating to a suspected
citizen without a warrant based on probable cause.90 This approach allows law
enforcement agencies to obtain such information in times of emergency, with
the consent of the device’s owner, or when available to the general public.91 This
approach offers a hybrid scheme of policies protecting real-time location data
by requiring warrants for data seizure by law enforcement, yet also allows law
enforcement to obtain that information under a specified set of circumstances
without a warrant.92
A contrasting strategy proposes offering protections to citizens’ location data
through the discretion of judges.93 An example of this strategy comes by way of
the Third Circuit.94 The Third Circuit limits instances in which a government
entity may require service providers to disclose customers’ data.95 Even though
there is some form of protection from law enforcement’s compelling service
providers to turn over information, no absolute protection exists since courts can
easily choose to order disclosure without a warrant with a sufficient showing of
government need.96 However, there are built-in protections in place that make
disclosure orders different from a normal warrant based on probable cause;
namely, law enforcement must meet certain requirements to convince courts to

Id. (allowing police to obtain mobile data in certain situations without a warrant).
Freedom from Location Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014).
91 VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E)(1-4) (2017) (permitting exceptions to the warrant
requirement in specific emergencies); see Commonwealth v. Rushing, 71 A.3d 939, 962
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (recognizing that under the Pennsylvania Constitution, citizens do
have legitimate expectations of privacy in their real-time location data and that tracking
allows police to locate people inside their private dwellings, where privacy expectations are
at the highest).
92 Freedom from Location Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014).
93 Cell Phone Location Tracking Laws by State, supra note 25 (showing the
jurisdictional differences in cell phone tracking laws).
94 In re United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commun. Serv. to
Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the
government, in order to compel production of citizens’ cell site location information, has a
lesser burden to prove than probable cause; however, courts have the discretion to require a
warrant prior to ordering service providers to turn over information).
95 Id. at 306–07 (explaining the various statutory circumstances that permit law
enforcement to obtain cell phone data without a warrant while also distinguishing between
the data stored on the phone and data stored remotely that the phone may access).
96 Id. (reasoning that there is a contradiction in the statute because warrants require
probable cause, but there is no such burden when seeking a court order for disclosure).
89
90
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compel disclosure without obtaining a warrant.97 This mix of protections and
pro-law enforcement policies has only attracted a small number of
jurisdictions.98
Finally, in an approach that might be described as a lack of a strategy, the only
uniting characteristic is that the jurisdiction has enacted no binding authority and
thus defaults to the majority rule of unprotected location data.99 This approach
simply follows the overall model that location data information from mobile
devices is unprotected.100 Until a concrete answer is given to the question of
warrantless tracking of location data, jurisdictions will continue to adhere to the
current model of allowing such tracking.101
The arguments presented above represent differing approaches for
determining what degree of protection to afford location data.102 With differing
strategies on the correct application of the Fourth Amendment to this issue,
resolution will come down to either states enacting their own laws103 or federal
courts uniting behind one common legal rule.104 However, even the federal
courts have reached an impasse between differing approaches and resolutions to
mobile device location data protections.105
II. FEDERAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND DIFFERING OUTCOMES
There is no recognized consensus on how to approach protection for mobiledevice location data.106 With the lack of agreement, the next step is to turn to the
federal court system to deliver a legal rule that unites the differing approaches,
yet that has not been forthcoming either.107 At the district court level, there is a
Id.
See generally Crump, supra note 78 (showing the jurisdictional differences in cell
phone tracking laws).
99 See generally id. (showing the jurisdictional differences in cell phone tracking laws).
100 See generally id. (highlighting the differences in various state’s approach to cell
phone data privacy).
101 See Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85
U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402).
102 Compare VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017), with Freedom from Location
Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a) (2017).
103 Compare VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E)(1-4) (2017), with Freedom from Location
Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a) (2017).
104 Compare VA. CODE § 19.2-70.3(E) (1-4) (2017), with Freedom from Location
Surveillance Act, 725 ILCS 168/1 (Ill. 2014), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546.1(a) (2017). See
supra Section I.D; infra Part II.
105 See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S.
June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402).
106 See generally Crump, supra note 78 (illustrating the differences between various
states’ laws regarding warrantless cell phone tracking).
107 Compare United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 608, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(holding that the third party doctrine did not apply to cellular signals intercepted by the
97
98
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split between courts that favor protecting location information and courts that
favor law enforcement conducting warrantless tracking.108 Contrastingly, the
circuit courts offer unified results.109 However, even that unity is showing signs
of cracking.110
A. Split District Court Decisions Further the Uncertainty Surrounding Location
Data Rights
On the lower end of the federal courts, there is disagreement between
supporting law enforcement’s use of location data without obtaining a warrant
and adamantly refusing to allow such data to be obtained without a warrant.111
In United States v. Ledbetter, 2015 WL 7758930 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2015), the
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio had to determine whether
citizens are protected from having their mobile devices’ records disclosed to
police investigating certain crimes.112 Upon analyzing the devices found in
Ledbetter’s vehicle, police issued subpoenas to obtain the devices’ records from
service providers in connection with multiple murder investigations.113
government), with United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1–2
(D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016) (denying the defendant’s motion to suppress cellular records
obtained from via the third party doctrine), and United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR080, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161693, at *41–42 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (holding the defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy for cellular records in the possession of a third
party), and In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1023–24 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that the large amount of data collected
and stored of a customer’s movement was within the reasonable expectation of privacy and
in violation of the 4th Amendment).
108 Compare Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 616 (holding that the third-party doctrine did
not apply to cellular signals intercepted by the government), with Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR080, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161693, at *41–42 (holding the defendant lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy for cellular records in the possession of a third party).
109 Compare Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1–2, with In re
Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1023–24 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
110 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (upholding the thirdparty doctrine and ruling that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy for
information given to a third party).
111 Compare Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1–2, with In re
Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d at
1023–24.
112 United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *41–42 (S.D.
Ohio Dec. 2, 2015) (describing an undercover police surveillance operation where upon
initiation of police stop the defendant only yielded after roughly one-tenth of a mile giving
probable cause to police to search and find $5,500 in cash, a small amount of marijuana,
three grams of cocaine, eight grams of marijuana, a 9mm handgun, $51,302 in cash, and five
mobile devices).
113 See United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D.
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Ultimately, the court held that Ledbetter lacked a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the records on the mobile devices obtained by law enforcement.114
Agreement soon came from the District of Connecticut in United States v.
Chavez, 2016 WL 740246 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016).115 In Chavez, the issue was
whether a magistrate judge’s order to compel Verizon to disclose Chavez’s
location data was an unconstitutional search and seizure.116 The court found that
there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the search and seizure principle
because the third-party doctrine applied.117 The third-party doctrine states
persons do not have reasonable expectations of privacy in their phone
conversations with others because the other party is free to reveal the contents
of the conversation to police.118 Applying the rule of law found in the third-party
doctrine, the court held that it was irrelevant that a suspect disclosed information
while in the privacy of the home and that disclosure reveals something the user
said or did in the home.119 The court also found no need to suppress the obtained
information because there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment or the
Stored Communication Act.120
A case on the opposite end of the protection spectrum is In re Application for
Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d
1011 (N.D. Cal. 2015).121 The Northern District of California, like California in

Ohio Dec. 2, 2015) (challenging the subpoenas contending that without valid search
warrants, “the police were not entitled to obtain those records because they might contain
historical cell-site location information.”).
114 United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 2, 2015) (holding that suppression is not a remedy that is available for a violation of
the Stored Communications Act, and for that additional reason his motions to suppress
failed).
115 United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1 (D. Conn. Feb.
24, 2016).
116 Id. (stating that the government obtained Chavez’s data records through a valid order
because the reasons stated in the application were seen to satisfy probable cause).
117 United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb.
24, 2016) (defining the third-party doctrine as, “a person does not have a right or interest
that is protected under the Fourth Amendment to prevent the Government from obtaining
information about a person that is in the custody of a third party and including information
that the person has voluntarily disclosed to a third party.”).
118 THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 7–9 (stating that when parties are invited to the
conversation or accept the use of devices, any person who has the information or is party to
that agreement may report to the authorities).
119 See Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *1 (holding a customer’s
preferences or wishes are not a controlling consideration for determining whether
information has been voluntarily given under the third-party doctrine).
120 Id. at *4.
121 In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1011, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

18

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 26.2

general,122 came down in favor of individual rights to location data.123 The court
gave a thorough analysis on mobile device information, often called “historical
cell site location information” (CSLI).124 CSLI includes the exact location of the
service provider’s tower that serves the mobile device’s call, text, or data
transfer.125 With the precise nature of base stations, it is now possible to know a
device’s location to within a relatively small geolocation.126 Analyzing the
government’s request for CSLI for a sixty-day retroactive period, the court found
that mobile devices clearly qualify as “effects” under the Fourth Amendment.127
Under that premise, the court ultimately held that individuals have an
expectation of privacy in CSLI associated with their mobile devices.128 Since the
individual’s privacy interest was reasonable and protected by society, the court
ruled that the government must obtain a warrant for any CSLI data.129
Finally, mere months after Chavez was decided, the Southern District of New
York held that to track location data a warrant must be received, with the scope
122 See DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1506 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy against searches of their attorney’s office
under the Fourth Amendment).
123 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119
F. Supp. 3d at 1013.
(holding that users’ expectations of privacy in location information associated with cellular
devices were reasonable).
124 See id. at 1013–14 (discussing how mobile device data is sent and received, and how
it can be monitored by service providers and the government, and discussing that to
facilitate better mobile device use, service providers maintain a network of radio base
stations (cell towers) with varying coverage areas).
125 See id. at 1014 (stating how a special agent from the FBI informed the court that
CSLI can be generated in the absence of any user interaction with the mobile device). Many
modern devices have applications that continuously run in the background, generating a
constant stream of incoming and outgoing data and additional testimony revealed that a
mobile device that is turned on will “ping” the nearest cell tower every seven to nine
minutes, and service providers keep track of CSLI generated in such fashion. See id.
126 See id. at 1015 (stating that at times the location can be so accurate that service
providers can identify individual floors and rooms within buildings).
127 See id. at 1019 (citing the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, homes, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures).
128 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1022–23 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (applying the following three principles: “(1)
an individual’s expectation of privacy is at its pinnacle when government surveillance
intrudes on the home; (2) long-term electronic surveillance . . . implicates an individual’s
expectation of privacy; and (3) location data generated by cell phones . . . can reveal a
wealth of private information about an individual.”).
129 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1023, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that since CSLI, like GPS, can
provide a comprehensive record of a person’s movements and individual preferences,
protection was warranted, and the government has to obtain a search warrant before
compelling disclosure of CSLI and location information from service providers).
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of the tracking limited to only those records specifically requested.130 In United
States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), the issue was whether
the use of a cell-site simulator, a device that mimics cell tower frequencies,
constituted an unreasonable search prohibited under the Fourth Amendment.131
The court found that use of such a device was an unreasonable search because
the forced “pings,” a ping being each time a device connects to a cell tower,132
constituted technology not available to the public.133 Additionally, the simulator
gave the DEA details of the home constituting a physical intrusion.134
Ultimately, the court found that the “pings” picked up by the simulator were
forced transmissions of electronic data identifying the phone’s exact location
until the DEA found the apartment.135
The district court decisions above show disagreement over the applicability
of the third-party doctrine to location information tracking cases.136 They also
show disagreement over whether mobile devices and data information are
protected.137 Interestingly, the district courts siding with law enforcement are
usually from jurisdictions in which the circuit court has ruled in favor of
warrantless tracking, whereas courts not in those jurisdictions have held the
opposite.
B. United States Circuit Court Opinions
Unlike the disagreement at the district court level, circuit courts currently
agree that there is no constitutional requirement for law enforcement to obtain a
warrant to gather location data from service providers.138 In the first circuit
United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Id. at 610 (distinguishing between CSLI and “ping” data by describing CSLI as the
aggregate data that is obtained by cell towers, including general location, device usage, and
numbers dialed while “pings” on the other hand are a means by which the police force the
mobile device to emit a data signal to pinpoint location).
132 Id. at 609.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 610-11 (holding, in a direct divergence from its sister court in Connecticut, that
without a search warrant, the government cannot turn citizens’ mobile devices into tracking
instruments).
135 Id. at 615–16 (holding the forced pings violate the Fourth Amendment’s search
protection because they are outside the normal operation of the mobile device).
136 In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1011, 1023, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2015); United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185,
2016 WL 740246, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016).
137 United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 2, 2015). See generally In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1019–20 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
138 United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358–59 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500
(11th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
130
131
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decision on this issue, the Sixth Circuit had to determine whether the
government’s use of real-time location tracking of two phones belonging to the
defendant constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.139 The court stated
that when criminals use modern technological devices to carry out criminal acts,
they cannot complain when law enforcement uses those same devices to
apprehend them.140
It held that when a tool being used to transport contraband gives off location
data signals, the law does not prevent police from tracking those signals.141
Similarly, there is no difference between physically trailing a suspect and
tracking the suspect through technological means.142 The government
strengthened its case by obtaining multiple orders to compel the disclosure of
GPS location information from Skinner’s phones.143 Ultimately, Skinner had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his location data and records suppression
was not warranted.144
Two years after Skinner, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Guerrero,
768 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2014).145 On the relevant CSLI and cell towers facts, the
court focused on the third-party doctrine and the Stored Communications Act.146

139 See Skinner, 690 F.3d at 774–76 (showing how the communications between two
phones belonging to the leader of the smuggling ring identified the defendant allowing law
enforcement to obtain new orders to compel the phones’ service provider to disclose
subscriber information, CSLI, GPS real-time location, and “ping” data from the phones
which in turn allowed law enforcement to track defendant’s movements throughout Texas
without any visual or physical surveillance).
140 Id. at 774 (reasoning that Skinner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data
being transmitted from his mobile device).
141 Id. at 777 (reasoning that the law “cannot be that a criminal is entitled to rely on the
expected untrackability [sic] of his tools.”).
142 See id. at 778 (stating that law enforcement must be allowed to adapt its tactics to
modern technology in order to prevent criminals from taking advantage of the criminal
justice system).
143 Id. at 779.
144 Id. at 781 (reasoning that no physical intrusion occurred because defendant obtained
the mobile devices for the purpose of communication, and GPS capabilities are included in a
phone’s function and elaborating that since authorities tracked a known cellular number,
which was voluntarily used during travel on public roads, the GPS location information was
public knowledge).
145 United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2014) (describing how CSLI
was introduced at trial regarding five phone calls made on the afternoon of a murder, and
the location information was used by law enforcement to put defendant at the scene of the
crime).
146 See id. at 358 (reasoning that data revealing the cell tower and sector to which the
mobile device sent its signals was only available from third-party service providers). The
SCA requires service providers to maintain records of transmissions and communications
made by devices on their networks and prohibits the government from obtaining that
information without following certain procedures outlined in statute. Id.
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It found the government in violation of the procedures outlined in the SCA,147
yet determined that suppressing the information was not appropriate; for
suppression to be granted, Guerrero would need to show the CSLI was obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.148
With regard to the Fourth Amendment, the court restated that mobile-device
users voluntarily convey information to service providers, knowing that the
service providers record location information.149 Since users have implied
recognition that their information is recorded to the same extent that landline
users understand numbers dialed are recorded, the court held that expectations
of privacy were unreasonable.150 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit determined there
was no Fourth Amendment violation and no reason to suppress the CSLI.151
Shortly after Guerrero, the Eleventh Circuit heard the case of United States
v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), and was faced with the question of
whether a court order authorized by the SCA to compel production of records
pertaining to CSLI violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights.152 The court
relied on the third-party doctrine and an unreasonable belief in the right to
location information privacy to deny the motion to suppress CSLI records.153 It
found that the cell tower records and CSLI belonged to MetroPCS, were stored
in electronic form in MetroPCS servers, and were stored by it as a third-party,
thereby preventing Davis from having any interest in the records’ ownership.154
Therefore, the court held the government obtained a valid court order to compel
production of the service provider’s records and even if production constituted
a search, obtaining records without a warrant was reasonable.155
These circuits have been the battleground for challenges to police use of
location data obtained by means of warrantless compulsion of service providers
to disclose records.156 They are a small, but united, portion of the federal circuit
Id.
Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See id. (explaining the court’s determination for not requiring the grant of a motion to
suppress because the government’s violation of the Stored Communications Act did not
amount to a Fourth Amendment violation).
152 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500, 502 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining a
case where the government produced telephone records obtained through court order from
MetroPCS, showing all the information from cellphone towers those calls were “pinged”
off).
153 See id. at 511 (reasoning that Davis could not assert ownership or possession over the
business records sought to be suppressed).
154 See id. (holding that Davis had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the business
records because users are aware that their phones do not work when they are outside the
service provider’s cell tower network).
155 Id. at 509.
156 Id. at 502; United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining a
147
148
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courts. However, no circuit to rule on this issue controls a jurisdiction in which
a district court has ruled in favor of a user’s right to location data.157
C. The Fourth Circuit Anomaly
In an interesting twist of jurisprudence, the Fourth Circuit became the first
federal court of appeals to rule in favor of a citizen’s right to privacy in location
data.158 However, in an en banc rehearing it promptly reversed the earlier
decision in favor of the individual.159 This case offers an analysis of how
undecided circuits may come to disagree with their sister circuits in the future
based on individual cases’ fact patterns.
The facts presented to the Fourth Circuit in the two Graham cases remained
the same.160 Aaron Graham and Eric Jordan were implicated in a string of
robberies perpetrated in Baltimore County, Maryland and police obtained
warrants for items found on the men or in their residences.161 However, the
government only obtained warrants for the physical mobile devices, and later
sought to compel the devices’ service providers to disclose CSLI pertaining to
text messages and call records.162 The Fourth Circuit determined that the
government’s obtaining the CSLI was an unreasonable search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.163 It reasoned that users of mobile devices have an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the information their devices
transmit.164 Yet the ruling was not a complete win for mobile device users
because the court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motions
to suppress because the government acted in good faith in obtaining the
scenario where the acquirement of information without a search warrant does not violate
Fourth Amendment rights); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012).
157 Davis, 785 F.3d at 500, 502; Guerrero, 768 F.3d at 358; Skinner, 690 F.3d at 775.
158 See United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 349 (4th Cir. 2015) (recognizing the
court’s own originality in Fourth Amendment privacy).
159 Graham, 824 F.3d at 424.
160 Graham, 796 F.3d at 342; see also Graham, 824 F.3d at 424 (showing similar
holdings that were consistent to the two Graham cases).
161 See Graham, 796 F.3d at 338.
162 See id. at 341 (explaining how the government sought two court orders for disclosure
of CSLI relating to calls and text messages for a 221-day span even after wireless services’
initial denials).
163 Id. at 343–45 (reasoning that absent subscriber notice and consent, the government
must secure a warrant or court order for the individual’s records after defining search
“within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs where the government invades a
matter in which a person has an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as
reasonable.”).
164 See id. at 345 (holding that inspection of such information by the government
requires a warrant unless one of the few established exceptions to the warrant requirement
apply).
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information.165
Upon an en banc rehearing, the entire panel of the Fourth Circuit held that the
government did not violate the Fourth Amendment by obtaining CSLI from
mobile devices without a warrant.166 Unlike the earlier decision, the en banc
panel determined that the third-party doctrine applied to this case.167 Under the
third-party doctrine, the court reasoned that the defendants had no legitimate
expectation of privacy to information voluntarily turned over to a third party.168
The now-united stance of circuits, compared to the disagreeing stance of
district courts, shows that the debate over whether law enforcement may obtain
location data without a warrant should be settled by the Supreme Court.169
Clearer guidance from the Supreme Court would bring a sense of finality to the
issue, or at least allow for a more uniform application of law. However,
achieving a bright-line ruling from the Court may prove to be more challenging
than expected.170
III. CLOSE, BUT NOT EXACT: PAST SUPREME COURT CASES
DEALING WITH GPS TRACKING AND USE OF PHONE CONTENTS
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of
mobile device location data.171 However, the Court has taken cases dealing with
major surveillance and technological issues in the past.172 Since its first
landmark technology surveillance decision in 1979,173 the Supreme Court has
slowly waded through the uncharted waters of modern technology, privacy
expectations, and police’s responses to technological advances.174
165 See id. at 362 (finding that the government relied on the Stored Communications Act
and two court orders in obtaining the CSLI from service providers and recognizing that
citizens have an inherently reasonable expectation to the privacy of their mobile
communications, but that the government can overcome that expectation if it relies in good
faith on statutes or court orders).
166 See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016).
167 See id. at 425 (holding that the third-party doctrine applies even when the information
is revealed to a third party “on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”).
168 See id. (showing that since the government acquired the records from the service
providers in the normal course of business, and did not view, listen to, record, or engage in
direct surveillance of defendants to obtain the information, there was no constitutional
violation).
169 Id.
170 See infra Part III.
171 See infra Sections III.A-E.
172 See infra Sections III.A-E.
173 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (“The installation and use
of a pen register, consequently, was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required.”).
174 See also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987) (holding that a mere recording
of serial numbers of stereo equipment in plain view does not constitute a “seizure”); City of
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A. Smith v. Maryland: Acceptable Surveillance when Risk is Assumed
The first landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court came in
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).175 This case set the tone that
surveillance is acceptable, especially when the person assumes the risk that
information could be given to police.176 The facts of Smith are simple; a man
driving a 1975 Monte Carlo robbed Patricia McDonough in Baltimore,
Maryland and shortly after, McDonough began receiving phone calls from the
robber and one day saw the Monte Carlo slowly driving past her front porch.177
Police had the telephone company install a pen register at its office to monitor
the calls being dialed from Smith’s phone.178 After installing the pen register,
without a warrant, police learned that Smith dialed McDonough’s home phone
on several occasions.179
The Supreme Court stated that application of the Fourth Amendment
depended upon whether an individual could claim a justifiable, reasonable, or
legitimate expectation of privacy that had been invaded by government action.180
The Court found that with the pen register installed on telephone company
property, Smith had no claim that his property was invaded.181Additionally,
Smith had no expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from his home
phone.182
The Court stated that even if individuals expect some level of privacy in the
Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 764–65 (2010); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 945, 948
(2010); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2486 (2014).
175 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46 (holding the use of a pen register by a telephone
company does not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
176 See id. at 745; see also LaChance, supra note 8.
177 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737 (describing a scenario where police found a man matching the
description given to them by McDonough in her general neighborhood, who was driving a
1975 Monte Carlo).
178 Id. at 736 (explaining a pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers
dialed on a telephone; it does not record conversations or completed calls, only the numbers
dialed into the phone).
179 Id. at 740 (explaining a scene where the police then received a warrant to search
Smith’s home, which revealed a telephone book with McDonough’s page folded
downwards).
180 Id. at 740 (presenting the new analysis into two questions: first, whether the
individual has shown he sought to preserve something as private, and second, whether the
individual’s expectation of privacy was justifiable under the circumstances).
181 Id. at 741 (reasoning that the pen register differed from a listening device, because
pen registers cannot record contents of communications per court findings in previous cases;
pen registers “disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed . . . Neither the
purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call . . . is
disclosed by pen registers.”).
182 Id. at 742 (reasoning that all telephone users realize they must give phone numbers to
the telephone company to complete the desired call).
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numbers they dial, society is not prepared to recognize such expectations as
reasonable.183 Even with some expectation of privacy, it is not legitimate and
does not satisfy the test for a “search.”184 This early landmark decision paved
the way for future Supreme Court cases dealing with surveillance.185
B. Arizona v. Hicks: Seizing an Object Must Be Based on a Standard Similar to
that of a Warrant
Eight years after Smith, the Court weighed the interests of the public against
the individual’s expectations of privacy, with a heavy emphasis on not depriving
citizens of their liberty from unreasonable government searches.186 Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) did not involve the use of mobile devices, but it has
been instrumental in formulating the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in the almost thirty years since it was handed down.187 Justice
Antonin Scalia presented an analytical and thorough dissection of the case in
accord with the Fourth Amendment.188 Justice Scalia stated that taking action
unrelated to the objectives of the authorized entry into the apartment, which
revealed new portions of the apartment’s contents, produced a new invasion of
privacy unjustified by the original circumstances validating the entry.189
Turning to the reasonableness of the search, the Court bluntly stated there
would be no doubt the search would be covered under the “plain view” doctrine
if the officers had probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen.190
Yet, a lack of probable cause turned this into a case of first impression for the
Court.191 Ultimately, it held that probable cause is required, thereby requiring a
standard as high as that of obtaining a warrant.192 The Court made sure to
183 Id. at 743–44 (arguing that because society was not willing to recognize this privacy
right, there is a presumption against its reasonableness; therefore, Smith assumed the risk
that the telephone company would reveal to police any numbers he dialed).
184 Id. at 745–46.
185 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
186 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (holding that there is nothing new in
the realization that the Constitution may sometimes insulate the criminal acts of a few to
protect the privacy interests of the majority).
187 LaChance, supra note 8.
188 See, e.g., Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323–25.
189 See, e.g., id. at 325 (“A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but
the bottom of a turntable.”).
190 See, e.g., id. at 323–25 (explaining that the State conceded that the officers involved
in the entry of the apartment had only a reasonable suspicion, meaning that it was less than
probable cause).
191 See, e.g., id. (arguing that the Court had never ruled on the question of whether
probable cause is required to invoke the “plain view” doctrine; in fact, earlier Court
decisions had explicitly mentioned that the issue was unresolved).
192 See, e.g., id. at 326 (highlighting that dispensing of the need for police to obtain a
warrant is not the same as settling for a lesser standard than a warrant would require).
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reinforce the point that just because an object can be seized without a warrant
does not mean that it may be seized without probable cause, the same standard
for obtaining court-authorized warrants.193
C. City of Ontario v. Quon: Work-Related Mobile Devices and Diminished
Privacy Expectations
Following a lull in location-tracking jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
decided City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).194 Quon focused on
whether an employer has the right in certain circumstances to read the text
messages sent and received from company-owned mobile devices.195 Jeff Quon,
a SWAT team member for the City of Ontario, California, was issued a pager
capable of sending and receiving text messages.196 With officers exceeding
imposed limits, the police looked into whether officers were using the devices
for non-work-related purposes.197
The Supreme Court had to determine whether an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment occurred, and importantly, whether individuals have a
reasonable privacy interest in their mobile device data.198 It found that the police
department made clear from the beginning that the mobile devices were not
considered private, their messages were subject to audits, and they were to be
used solely for work-related purposes.199 Yet, Justice Kennedy’s opinion
advocated caution and refrained from issuing a sweeping decision.200
Accordingly, such decisions must be made in light of the expectation of privacy
193 See, e.g., id. at 323–25 (reasoning that the mere fact that an object came within an
officer’s plain view does not, by itself, do away with the requirement of probable cause or a
warrant).
194 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 750 (2010).
195 Id.
196 See id. at 751 (demonstrating how the Ontario Police Department held a meeting
where it was explained that the messages sent on the pages were considered e-mail and were
eligible for auditing by the City).
197 See id. at 752 (showing that due to Quon’s excessive overage each month, the police
department asked Arch Wireless to provide it with transcripts of his messages sent and
received).
198 See id. at 766–67 (holding that the police did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because the audit was ordered to determine the result of the character limits while
determining that the search was not reasonable in its scope, and that there were other means
to go about the search that were less intrusive).
199 Id.
200 See id. at 759 (“The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become
clear” because “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication and information
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as
proper behavior.”).
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society places upon the use of such technology and, as of Quon, there was no
satisfactory gauge of society’s attitude to issue a broad opinion.201
The Court found that Quon did have a reasonable, but minimal, expectation
of privacy in his text messages.202 As a police officer, he should have known his
actions and work-related communications were subject to scrutiny.203 In
determining the reasonableness of the search, the Court stated that even though
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, specifically established exceptions
exist.204 Ultimately, the search was found to be motivated by legitimate workrelated purposes, limited in scope, and reasonable under precedent, thereby
making it constitutional.205 This decision was one of the last significant
developments in mobile device surveillance that did not deal with GPS and
location-specific tracking of enabled smart devices.206
D. United States v. Jones: Tracking of Citizens’ Vehicles by Means of GPS is
a No-Go
Delving deeper into technology and the GPS capabilities of modern devices,
the Court issued a landmark ruling in 2012 that protected individuals’ rights to
privacy of their vehicles and against searches.207 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400 (2010), is a rare unanimous opinion for a major issue case.208 It marks the
first time that the Court ruled against the government and police on a major
tracking decision.209 Antoine Jones owned a nightclub and was under
201 See id. at 758–60 (opining how it was not known whether society expressed a greater
expectation of privacy because of self-identification and ubiquity of mobile device usage, or
whether the devices had become so mainstream that employees could purchase their own if
they did not want their employers to search the content).
202 See id. at 760 (highlighting that while Quon may have had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the text messages, the police department did not necessarily violate his Fourth
Amendment rights by obtaining and reviewing the records).
203 See id. at 760 (holding that even if Quon could assume some level of privacy, it was
not reasonable to believe that the text messages were immune from scrutiny under all
circumstances).
204 See id. (describing one such exception is the “special needs” of the workplace to
justify employers searching company-owned devices).
205 See generally Suuberg, supra note 12 (noting that for over two decades of decisions,
only 20% of Supreme Court opinions on criminal procedure matters have individual rights
trumping government interests and expressing that needs for law enforcement appears to
persuade the Court more than any other governmental interest).
206 City of Ontario v. Quon, EPIC.ORG, https://epic.org/privacy/quon/ (last visited May
24, 2018) (outlining the case as one of workers’ employment privacy rights, not necessarily
one of electronic rights in location).
207 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012) (ruling that individuals have a
reasonable expectation in privacy in vehicles).
208 See generally id.
209 See id. (deciding whether attaching a GPS device to a citizen’s vehicle and
subsequently using the device to monitor the vehicle’s movements constituted a search).
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investigation by the FBI and District of Columbia Police for trafficking
narcotics.210 The police obtained a warrant to install a GPS device on Jones’s car
within ten days and within the District of Columbia.211 However, the police did
not install the device until the eleventh day, and it was installed in Maryland.212
Using the device attached to Jones’s car, the government was able to record
his movements to within fifty feet, all of which was relayed to government
computers.213 On appeal of his conviction, the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the admission of evidence obtained
through warrantless use of GPS tracking violated the Fourth Amendment.214 The
Supreme Court, after granting certiorari, found that the government physically
occupied private property for the sole purpose of obtaining information, which
would have been considered a search under the Fourth Amendment when it was
originally adopted.215 The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the D.C. Circuit
in favor of Jones because the warrantless encroachment on property was
unreasonable and unconstitutional.216 Jones, and the Court’s decision in Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), are the basis for much of the current debate
on location data tracking and whether police need to obtain warrants for such
information.
E. Riley v. California: Mobile Devices Are Much More than Mere Wireless
Telephones
The most recent decision on warrantless location data tracking struck a blow

210 See id. at 402 (describing how the joint task force employed different techniques to
watch Jones, including visual surveillance, installing cameras to watch the nightclub, and
adding a pen register and wiretap on Jones’s cell phone).
211 Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03.
212 See id. (2012) (explaining how the government tracked the car of the defendant for
the twenty-eight days, and the ensuing information produced over 2,000 pages of data).
213 See id. at 403–04 (demonstrating that during Jones’s first trial, the district court
granted a suppression motion for the data relating to the times the vehicle was at Jones’s
residence and parked in his garage but admitted all data as to when the vehicle was traveling
on public roads while during a second trial, the government admitted the entirety of the
tracking data, and a guilty conviction was rendered, placing Jones in prison for life).
214 Id.
215 See id. at 408 (reasoning that the text of the Fourth Amendment reflects a close
connection to property, defining a reasonable expectation of privacy as, “an expectation
‘that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real
or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society.’”).
216 See id. at 412 (finding that the attachment of GPS tracking devices to vehicles, and
the subsequent tracking of the vehicle’s movements, constituted an unconstitutional search
under the Fourth Amendment).
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to law enforcement and gave a win to privacy advocates.217 Riley v. California
revolved around the traffic stop of David Riley and culminated in the seizure of
his mobile-device.218 The issue arose from the officer’s actions at the scene of
the arrest, and later at the police station, of accessing information on Riley’s
phone without a warrant.219 With the information, Riley was convicted of firing
into an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted
murder, which carried enhanced penalties of fifteen years to life in prison.220
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court, in which seven Justices
joined, and one Justice entered a concurring opinion.221 Chief Justice Roberts
began by stating that, “[o]ur cases have determined that ‘[w]here a search is
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial
warrant.’”222 That reiteration of clearly established law was followed by the
mandate that in the absence of a warrant, searches are only reasonable if they
fall within one of the specifically recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement.223 The question that the Court sought to resolve was whether the
search incident to arrest doctrine applies to information stored on modern mobile
devices.224 Noting that there was little guidance from earlier Court
jurisprudence, the standard for determining whether to exempt a search from the
warrant requirement lies in a balancing test.225
217 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014); LaChance, supra note 8.
02/29/468609371/at-supreme-court-debate-over-phone-privacy-has-a-long-history (citing
Jones and Riley as the latest in succession of cases on expectation of privacy).
218 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480 (holding that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a mobile phone).
219 See, e.g., id. at 2480–81 (describing how the officers at the scene accessed
information on the device that identified other members of the “Bloods” gang, contact lists,
and text messages when a detective who specialized in gangs explicitly examined files that
“caught his eye” such as videos, photographs, and messages relating to possible gang
activity).
220 Id.
221 Id. at 2481.
222 See, e.g., id. at 2482.
223 Id. at 2494; see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that a
suspect arrested for driving with a revoked license could be searched incident to arrest);
Evans v. Solomon, 681 F. Supp. 2d 233, 248-49 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that a search of a
suspect stopped for a traffic violation was legitimate because probable cause to arrest
existed at the time of the search and the search was valid as a search incident to arrest); see
also Drew Liming, Calling for a Standard: Why Courts Should Apply a New Balancing Test
in Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 715, 729 (2014) (discussing
officer’s search of your cell phone would frequently be permitted under the search incident
to arrest exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
224 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (noting the Court made the point that modern
mobile devices are a pervasive and insistent part of Americans’ daily lives).
225 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (noting the balancing test employed assesses “on
the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other,
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After a lengthy consideration of the balance between individual privacy
interests and the government’s interest in protecting society, the Court held that
officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search like in
Riley.226 In regards to the search incident to arrest exception, the Chief Justice
Roberts recognized its validity and that it rests both on the heightened
governmental interests at stake as well as on the arrestee’s reduced privacy
interests once in custody.227 However, with the advent of modern mobile devices
such as cell phones, privacy concerns implicated are far beyond those of the
traditional wallet, cigarette pack, or purse.228
The opinion then moved on to a general description of the difference between
mobile devices and traditional objects normally kept on an arrested person’s
body.229 Many cell phones are in fact minicomputers, cameras, video players,
calendars, recorders, libraries, and maps.230 Additionally, storage capabilities of
modern mobile devices have several important consequences for individual’s
privacy interests.231 Like previous courts, the Supreme Court touched on CSLI,
but to a much different effect. It recognized that CSLI is a standard feature on
modern mobile devices, often able to track a person’s movements down to
specific locations and the exact time data was collected, all of which warrant
some level of privacy protection.232 Consequently, the Court explained that a
search of a mobile device in today’s age reveals much more to the government
than a traditional search of a house because the device contains the digital form

the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”).
226 See, e.g., id. at 2493; cf. Liming, supra note 223, at 729 (contending that balancing
tests weigh legitimate interests of both law enforcement and suspected citizens; additionally,
bright-line rules do not give courts enough flexibility to respond to new developments in
technology).
227 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488 (reiterating that law enforcement officers are still
free to examine the physical aspects of a phone in order to ensure that it cannot be used as a
weapon, yet the interest of protecting officers from harmful objects does not justify
dispensing with the warrant requirement in totality).
228 See, e.g., id. at 2488–89 (stressing that while searches of arrested persons’ pockets for
physical items implicate privacy interests, it is not coextensive to that of digital data).
229 See, e.g., id. at 2489.
230 See, e.g., id.
231 See, e.g., id. at 2489–90 (illustrating that (1) mobile devices collect many distinct
types of information in one place that reveals much more than any isolated record, such as
addresses, notes, prescriptions, bank statements, and videos; (2) the devices’ capacities
allow one piece of information to convey far more than previous devices were capable of,
through photographs with dates, locations, and descriptions; and (3) data on devices can
date to the purchase of the device, which could potentially include months’ worth of data on
one conversation, and fourth, unlike physical records, mobile devices have an element of
pervasiveness that makes it possible to carry on one’s person a cache of sensitive personal
information on a daily basis).
232 See, e.g., id. at 2490 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414 (2012)).
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of sensitive records that would be found in a home, as well as private information
that is never kept in a home.233
The Court recognized that the data stored on these devices can contain
incriminating information regardless of when the crime occurred.234
Additionally, call logs on mobile devices can include information that identifies
other individuals or special names that the owner might give to loved ones.235
Finally, the Court admitted its decision will undoubtedly impact the ability of
law enforcement to combat crime, yet it rationalizes that consequence by the fact
that privacy comes at a cost.236 In its final ruling, the Court made sure to state
that mobile device data is not always immune, only that warrants are generally
required for police to obtain the information contained in these devices.237 From
such a lengthy and detailed analysis of mobile-device usage and data
information contained therein, the Court came to a rather simple holding: when
police seize a mobile-device incident to arrest, they must obtain a warrant before
searching the device.238
Background material and legal jurisprudence show that strong opinions by
district courts on both sides of the issue exist.239 Circuit courts have formed a
united front on the pro-law enforcement side.240 Even Supreme Court case law
233 See, e.g., id. at 2491 (distinguishing between data that is stored on the device itself
and data which is stored in remote servers such as “cloud computing” and service provider
servers).
234 See, e.g., id. at 2492 (reasoning that devices will contain location data or texting data
that is indicative of past crimes or illegal acts that were never contemplated by police when
performing a simple traffic stop or citation).
235 See, e.g., id. at 2493.
236 See id. at 2493–94 (noting Chief Justice Roberts discussion on how mobile devices
have become important tools in the coordination of criminal enterprises and can provide
incriminating information about criminals to police and about how these devices are so
pervasive in society that to allow for their search without a warrant or an exception to the
warrant requirement would subject the vast majority of innocent citizens to unconstitutional
searches).
237 See, e.g., id. at 2493.
238 See, e.g., id. at 2495.
239 United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 2, 2015) (discussing the motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of a traffic
stop on December 18, 2007, as well as various cell phone records obtained without search
warrants); United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 608, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing
the DEA’s use of the cell-site simulator to locate Lambis’s apartment was an unreasonable
search); In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1013, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (concluding that cell phone users have an expectation
of privacy in the historical CSLI associated with their cell phones, and that society is
prepared to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable); United States v. Chavez,
No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016 WL 740246, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016) (concluding that the
Government’s acquisition of this information was neither a “search” nor “seizure” that is
subject to the requirements of the Fourth).
240 See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2014); United States
v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 774, 777 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 500, 518
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does not set a clear precedent to follow.241 With such opinions on whether law
enforcement can compel mobile device location data to be turned over without
a warrant, the Court must settle the dispute with a clear, precedential decision.
IV. WARRANTLESS USE OF MOBILE LOCATION TRACKING DATA IS
A SEARCH . . . SOMETIMES: CREATING AN EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT THROUGH AN ADAPTED TEST
With all of the differing approaches taken by states, federal courts, and the
Supreme Court, it seems nearly impossible to reconcile the differences in order
to make one coherent legal policy.242 The proposed solution is to do away with
the competing court rulings and implement a balancing test that will combine
Supreme Court precedent with concepts from the differing lower court
rulings.243 This solution is necessitated by the fact that warrantless use of mobile
location data to track suspects by law enforcement can be constitutional under
certain circumstances, but may be highly unconstitutional under others.244
A. Location Data Taken Without a Warrant Are, and Are Not, Searches
Depending on Each Case
In the evolving world of technology, Americans are immersing themselves to
greater depths in mobile devices and their associated risks.245 Due to the increase
in mobile device use, law enforcement has adapted tracking methods to
incorporate the data emanated from those devices.246 However, the combination
(11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 424, 438 (4th Cir. 2016).
241 Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 40–41 (discussing the history of relevant
precedents set by the Supreme Court).
242 See Lauren E. Babst, No More Shortcuts: Protect Cell Site Location Data with a
Warrant Requirement, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 383 (2015) (discussing
the different conclusions reached throughout the United States federal jurisdiction).
243 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (discussing the different
factors, courts have given weight to including the uses to which a person has put a location).
244 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430–31 (2012) (noting that the court need
not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search,
for the line was surely crossed before the 4–week mark).
245 See Smith, supra note 23 (noting that over 68% of American adults now own
smartphones); James M. Lucas, The Fourth Amendment - Are Mobile Phones Now
Governmental Tracking Devices, 67 S.M.U. L. REV. 211, 216 (2014) (noting in 1986, there
were only 340,213 mobile phone subscribers in the United States and there were
approximately 315 million mobile phone subscribers in 2011).
246 Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 41 (stating that wireless technology has
become a powerful tool in criminal investigation and prosecution as well as law
enforcement); Babst, supra note 242, at 383 (quoting Justice Sotomayor’s concern about
protecting location information, as she questioned the “appropriateness of entrusting to the
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of mobile device use and law enforcement location data tracking creates serious
concerns as to the amount of personal information being turned over to police,
coupled with many suspects being tracked without a warrant.247
1. Competing Strategies, Federal Court Rulings, and Supreme Court
Jurisprudence
Courts across the United States have been unable to agree on what kind of
protection to give citizens, if any protection at all, in their mobile location
data.248 Courts that follow the Skinner line of reasoning base protections on the
fact that federal courts have determined no warrant is necessary for police to
obtain location tracking data.249 Other courts follow California’s stance that a
warrant is necessary for law enforcement to obtain any location data information
from service providers, a stance that is often achieved through state
legislation.250 Yet others have put citizens and law enforcement in the position
of protecting privacy interests in some cases and not protecting those interests
in other cases.251 With no clear consensus among lower courts, it would be
logical to rely on the higher federal courts to sort out the matter because of their
jurisdictional authority.
However, higher federal courts have been no better at dealing with the
problem. District courts have refused to follow circuit court rulings unless they
Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to
misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercise of
police power to [sic] and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’”).
247 See Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 41 (positing that the increased use of
wireless technology as a law enforcement tool has lowered the barriers for acquiring any
type of personal information from individuals’ devices); Babst, supra note 242, at 380
(discussing that in order to properly analyze the scope of the privacy interests at stake,
courts must account for the fact that modern technology can store vastly greater amounts of
data and disclose much more revealing personal information than past technology); cf. Riley
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
248 See Babst, supra note 242, at 383 (discussing the choices courts face when deciding
whether to follow Supreme Court Fourth Amendment precedent from an era before modern
cell phones, or instead consider what legal standards should apply in light of the dramatic
changes in technology).
249 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 774, 775 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that
individuals do not have reasonable expectations of privacy in location data); Carpenter v.
United States, 819 F.3d 880, 895 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S.
June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402).
250 See S. 178, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
251 See In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Communic’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2010)
(discussing a governmental entity may require a provider of electronic communication
service or remote computing service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a
subscriber to or customer of such service (not including the contents of communications)
only when the governmental entity obtains a warrant).
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are in their jurisdiction; while not required to adopt circuit decisions outside their
jurisdiction, this may tend to support the general disagreement between district
courts over the proper application of Fourth Amendment law.252 Ledbetter came
out of the District of Ohio, within the Sixth Circuit, and like its parent circuit, it
determined that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.253 Yet, In re
Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2015) rejected the Sixth Circuit’s ruling and since its
parent the Ninth Circuit has no controlling precedent, held that the individual’s
expectation of privacy was reasonable.254 Therefore, the ultimate decision must
come from the Supreme Court, for only it can settle division among the lower
federal courts.
Even the Supreme Court is not entirely enlightening on this issue because it
has a history of rulings that lead to different conclusions.255 In Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), the Court set the tone for police surveillance
being permissible when the individual assumes the risk that their information
could be turned over to police.256 Yet, the Jones ruling flipped the tables and
held that it is unconstitutional for law enforcement to use GPS tracking on
personal property to track suspects’ movements.257 The problem is that the Court
has never taken a case where the issue solely revolved around CSLI and location
data tracking; the closest is arguably Riley, but even that does not entirely fit into
the mold of warrantless CSLI and location data tracking.258
Perhaps the Court will use Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir.
2015), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402), to
settle the issue once and for all.259 Carpenter asks the Court to consider whether

See supra Part II.
United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
2015 Dec. 2, 2015).
254 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that individuals have an expectation of
privacy in the historical CSLI associated with their cell phones, and that such an expectation
is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable).
255 See also supra Part III.
256 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (holding that it would be
unreasonable for the depositor to expect for his financial records to remain private).
257 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that the Government’s
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the
vehicle’s movements, constitutes a “search”).
258 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480–81 (2014) (focusing on the physical
inspection of Riley’s mobile device for pictures, text messages, videos, and other forms of
CSLI contained on the phone itself).
259 See Hurley, supra note 40 (recognizing the need for the Supreme Court to make clear
that Fourth Amendment protections apply with undiminished force to sensitive cellphone
digital records).
252
253
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the warrantless seizure and search of 127 days of CSLI data to track Carpenter’s
movements is constitutional.260 However, while this may be the timeliest and
most relevant case to reach the Court, there is no guarantee the Court will address
the underlying issue of privacy rights in one’s CSLI data considering how the
Court has avoided the issue at almost every turn or chose to rule on other points
of law.261
2. Individual Privacy Rights, The Fourth Amendment, and Balancing
Individual privacy and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment
should be protected to the fullest extent of the law. Yet the protections should
not interfere with the police’s duty to protect the public.262 Courts need to
undertake a balancing of public interest against personal privacy expectations
extending beyond the traditional secure-in-one’s-home analysis.263 This would
be different from the traditional reasonableness test because it builds upon, and
expands, the test already in place to cover electronic devices.264 As discussed in
Quon, legal jurisprudence has not caught up to expanding use of mobile
devices.265 The American legal landscape has changed in the six years since
Quon, as there are now more research studies, public opinion polls, and legal
jurisprudence on Americans’ use of mobile devices and privacy expectations
society attaches to information on the devices.266
260 See Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 85
U.S.L.W. 3567 (U.S. June 5, 2017) (No. 16–402).
261 Hurley, supra note 40. The Court is just as likely to punt the issue by merely deciding
another point of law as it is to decide the issue of CSLI privacy rights. It may choose to
follow the Smith approach that this culmination of days is unconstitutional without a
warrant, without even touching the underlying issues. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 404 (2012); In re Application of United States for an Order for Prospective Cell
Site Location Information on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 462 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
262 See Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (discussing the public’s opinions on privacy
protections and national security); Moore, supra note 60; Tracey Maclin, The Central
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. Rᴇᴠ. 197, 238 (1993) (discussing
the balance between Fourth Amendment protections and responsibilities and duties of police
officers in maintaining law and order in American society).
263 See Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (discussing the public’s opinions on privacy
protections and national security).
264 See id. (detailing how Americans are torn between protecting their mobile devices
and allowing the government to protect the entire society); Maclin, supra note 262, at 211.
265 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 748 (2010) (recognizing that the Court
did not have enough information or expertise to gauge whether society was in favor of
protecting mobile device information or if it was willing to allow the government leeway in
searching the information).
266 See Rainie, supra note 58 (finding that 74% of Americans believe it is very important
they are in control of who gets their information, and 65% say it is very important they be
able to control what information is collected about them).
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In a Pew Research Center study, 5% of Americans surveyed were “very
confident” the records kept by their mobile device’s service provider were
private and secure, whereas 31% were “not at all confident.”267 Additionally,
when asked how confident they were that their search engine history records,
social media site records, and online video site records would be kept secure and
private, 1% of Americans were “very confident.”268 While the survey may show
that Americans are very skeptical about the security of CSLI and location data
searches, it more likely shows that they have a very low expectation of privacy
for their information in those mediums.269 There is something inherently
disturbing when considering that Americans do not feel that their private and
sensitive information are protected from the prying eyes of their own
government.270
The current reasonableness test has been used by every circuit court to rule in
favor of law enforcement,271 yet that test is outdated and does not take into
account the modern development of mobile-device technology and sentiment
that Americans attach to their devices.272 In 1903, Edgar Kinkead stated, “Next
to the security of one’s person, life and health, the safety of his belongings and
possessions from disturbance is the most valuable of all his civil rights.”273 That
statement is as relevant today as it was in 1903, and perhaps even more relevant.
Americans value their mobile devices like they value jewelry, watches, and their
passports.274 In fact, 62% of Americans get information about health conditions

Id.
Rainie, supra note 58 (stating for search engine history, 41% were “not at all
confident”; for social media records, 45% were “not at all confident”; and for online video
site records, 42% were “not at all confident”).
269 See id.
270 Id. (stating that America is meant to be a “free” country in which its citizens are not
harassed by the government and can live in a manner that is free from the oversight of Big
Brother at every turn); Ms. Smith, Americans feel they have no privacy, don’t trust
government or advertisers, CSO (Nov. 12, 2014, 3:55 PM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2846048/microsoft-subnet/americans-feel-they-have-noprivacy-dont-trust-government-or-advertisers.html.
271 Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct 1867, 1871 (1989) (“[A]ll claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force– deadly or not– in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment
and its objective ‘reasonableness’ standard.”).
272 Id.; see Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (stating that modern mobile
devices are a pervasive part of Americans’ daily lives, and that any test must take that factor
into account).
273 See 2 EDGAR KINKEAD, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF TORTS: A PHILOSOPHICAL
DISCUSSION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING CIVIL WRONGS EX DELICTO 983
(1903) (highlighting the importance of feeling confident in one’s personal privacy rights).
274 Cf. Smith, supra note 23 (showing that over half of Americans with mobile devices
use them on a daily and constant basis).
267
268
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on their mobile devices, 57% do online banking, 40% look up government
information, and 43% find information about jobs.275
Most informative is that Americans in 2016 overwhelmingly felt that it is
“very important” to control who can get information on them and what
information is collected.276 Coupled with 46% saying they “couldn’t live
without” their mobile devices,277 there is an expectation of privacy in the
information and CSLI that mobile devices emit on a near-constant basis.278 It
stands to reason that Americans now, more than ever, value their mobile data
and location information privacy.279
While it may appear that location data can be included under the data
protected by the Court in Riley,280 a distinction must be made.281 The data
searched on Riley’s mobile device was akin to data that might be found on a
camera, laptop, iPod, tablet, or other device containing personal information and
memories.282 Yet, location data was not seized from his mobile device, and the
Court did not explicitly include location data in its holding.283 Location data is
an extremely specific subset of information data that is stored on mobile
devices.284 Location data, which is technically known as “cell site location
information” (CSLI), encompasses any signals or location-specific information
transmitted from a device to a cell tower.285
Searches and seizures of this data need to be protected through warrants
because they are the modern equivalent of one’s most personal secrets.286 For
Id.
See Rainie, supra note 58 (discussing Americans’ attitudes about personal
information privacy).
277 Smith, supra note 23.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014) (stating that some of the data
accessed by police included contact lists, text messages, videos, photographs, and
messages).
281 See id. at 2480 (stating that some of the data accessed by police included contact lists,
text messages, videos, photographs, and messages).
282 Id.
283 Id. at 2489 (discussing the importance of location data to new electronic devices
despite the case not explicitly involve location data, therefore setting the tone for future
cases purely involving location data).
284 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1013–15 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
285 See supra Section II.A.
286 See Michael Grothaus, iPhone 7 vs Samsung Galaxy S7: The BIG Flagship Fight
Rages On, KNOW YOUR MOBILE (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.knowyourmobile.com/mobile
phones/apple-iphone-7/23410/iphone-7-vs-samsung-galaxy-s7-edge-specs-features-pricedetailed-ios-10-android-n (showing that since the release of the first iPhone by Apple in
2007, the mobile device has become implanted into the average American’s daily life
because they provide GPS services, banking services, news services, and store unimaginable
amounts of data); Rainie, supra note 58 (acknowledging 65% of Americans want to control
275
276
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example, had the British known where and when General Washington’s troops
were crossing the Delaware River, the American Revolution may have ended
very differently. Similarly, if the government knows citizens’ whereabouts at all
times, there is an inherent breakdown of personal freedoms and protections.287
3. Post-September 11 America, the PATRIOT Act, and New American
Expectations
It has been over fifteen years since September 11, 2001, and Americans have
moved beyond the terror-infused mentality that spurred the government to
collect troves of data for “security” reasons.288 In recent twenty-first century
America, a majority of Americans are not willing to sacrifice their personal
liberties and privacy rights to the same degree to allow collecting and retaining
data.289 There is a definite difference between the years immediately following
the terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. where
Americans were willing to allow passage of such laws as the PATRIOT Act,290
and today where Americans have slid more towards the middle of protecting the
nation but also not invading personal liberties.291
The PATRIOT Act was one of the most all-encompassing and comprehensive
national security laws to be passed in modern America,292 and with that came a
greatly diminished sense of personal privacy and security in one’s electronic
communications.293 At that time, Americans were willing to forego those

what information is collected about them).
287 See infra Section IV.A.3.
288 Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (highlighting the opinion of one man, “[t]his is a scary
world and if it helps find terrorists or helps combat the war against terrorism, then it’s
OK.”).
289 See Rainie, supra note 58 (noting that 65% of Americans say there are not enough
limits on what telephone and internet data the government can collect on citizens); Susan
Milligan, A Question of Risk, U.S. Nᴇᴡs (June 12, 2015, 6:00 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/06/12/privacy-or-terrorism-aquestion-of-risk (finding that Americans are now less willing to give up privacy to protect
them from terrorism).
290 David W. Moore, Public Little Concerned About Patriot Act, GALLUP (Sept. 9, 2003),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/9205/public-little-concerned-about-patriot-act.aspx.
291 Id.; Rosenbaum, supra note 59; Milligan, supra note 289 (finding that Americans are
now less willing to give up privacy to protect them from terrorism).
292 See Dara Lind, Everyone’s heard of the Patriot Act. Here’s what it actually does,
VOX (June 2, 2015), https://www.vox.com/2015/6/2/8701499/patriot-act-explain; Jeremy
Diamond, Everything you need to know about the Patriot Act debate, CNN (May 23, 2015,
1:44 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/05/22/politics/patriot-act-debate-explainernsa/index.html.
293 See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. §§ 201-03, 209, 213-14
(allowing the government to intercept communications related to terrorism and computer
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protections and securities in order to secure the nation against future terrorist
attacks and foreign actions.294 However, Americans have generally moved away
from that mentality, due to the passage of time from the attack and newfound
technology, to a mentality that leans more towards protecting personal
information unless it is for extreme national security purposes.295
It is high time that the Supreme Court, and thus all American courts, recognize
a new and expanded reasonableness test to deal with the advent of modern
technology, mobile-device use, and American expectations of privacy in
electronic information. That new and expanded test would be served well by the
creation of a legally recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.296 Such a new exception to the warrant requirement could be
effectuated through a modernized reasonableness test focusing on balancing the
rights and interests of the individual against the interests of the government in
preventing crime.297
B. Create a New Exception to the Warrant Requirement by a Modern Take on
a Traditional Test
The Supreme Court has a duty to settle the issue of law enforcement obtaining
mobile-device location data through warrantless compulsion of service
providers. This question, how far police and the government can go to use
location data against a person when the data was obtained without a warrant, has
been skirted or only addressed in generalities by the Court to date.298 With the
fraud, share criminal investigative information, seize voice-mail messages with warrants,
delay notification of a warrant being issued, and modify the law relating to pen registers);
see Lind, supra note 292.
294 See Rosenbaum, supra note 59; Lind, supra note 292.
295 See generally Owsley, supra note 9, at 224 (referencing Congressman Bliley’s
concern over the government knowing too much about cell phone subscribers’ locations);
Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (reporting privacy concerns as cell phone and GPS technology
becomes more advanced).
296 See generally Roberto Iraola, New Detection Technologies and the Fourth
Amendment, 47 S.D. L. REV. 8, 15 (2002) (explaining the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
clause and how the reasonableness clause has historically found refuge in unique
circumstances).
297 Id. at 15–16.
298 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (finding a lack of “precise
guidance” in how to determine what type of search to exempt from the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (stating that the
judiciary must proceed with caution in not making a ruling before knowing where electronic
communications fit into society); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (holding that a
police officer’s viewing of an item in plain view does not constitute a search but physically
moving furniture to see something does constitute a search); Ryan Birss, Alito’s Way:
Application of Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion in United States v. Jones to Cell Phone
Location Data, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 899, 928 (2014) (concluding that the majority opinion in
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ever-evolving and expanding world of mobile device communications and
GPS,299 there needs to be a clear rule for courts to follow when facing such
challenges.300 One solution is for the Supreme Court to create a newly
recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.301 This
exception would recognize the modern expectation of privacy in mobile devices,
thereby making such tactics a search and allow police to bypass the warrant
requirement only upon a sufficient showing of government need outweighing
privacy interests.302
1. Recognize the Modern Expectation of Privacy in One’s Mobile Device
Location Data
It is imperative for the Supreme Court to recognize that the average American
has a strong, personal, and reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes to
all data on his or her mobile devices, data that undeniably includes locationbased information.303 The Court should establish a binding presumption on the
right to privacy of mobile-device location data, a presumption that makes it a
search to obtain such data.304 However, that presumption should come with a
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) limits privacy interest in cell phone
technology and noting that Justice Alito’s concurrence gives courts a way to allow
Americans to have a reasonable expectation of privacy of their location through cell phone
data).
299 See Elizabeth Gula Hodgson, The Propriety of Probable Cause: Why the U.S.
Supreme Court Should Protect Historical Cell Site Data with a Higher Standard, 120 PA.
ST. L. REV. 251, 277 n.195 (2015) (noting Congress recognizes an increase of triangulation
and GPA usage with the advent of smartphones thus effecting a greater need for law
enforcement to show probable cause to obtain a warrant).
300 See id.
301 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (employing a balancing test that weighs the degree of
intrusion upon an individual’s privacy compared to the degree needed for the promotion of
government interests).
302 See infra Section IV.B.1–2; see also Exigent Circumstances, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exigent_circumstances (last visited May 24, 2018)
(defining the exigency exception) (applying the exigency exception when an officer does
not have sufficient time to secure a warrant, reasonably believes safety is at risk, or
reasonably believes that evidence will be destroyed).
303 See Babst, supra note 242, at 378–79 (showing that cell phone users take steps to
privatize data tracking in their smartphones); cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (distinguishing
that the third-party doctrine does not apply to CSLI and location data obtained directly
through a mobile device or forced “pings”). See generally Smith, supra note 23 (stating that
a “number of Americans” only access to the Internet is through a smartphone).
304 See In re Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119
F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (reasoning that mobile devices are considered
modern “effects” protected under the Fourth Amendment); KINKEAD, supra note 273, at 283
(recognizing that protecting one’s belongings and possessions is the most valuable civil
rights besides health and security).
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caveat that it is not absolute and may be rebutted by a strong showing of public
need.305
Courts must undertake a balancing of competing interests to determine the
level of intrusion, expectation of privacy, and ultimate potential harm to the
public.306 In a perfect world, police would also perform the balancing test in
order to ensure accountability and privacy protections; however, this is not a
perfect world and the most practical means of accomplishing the balancing test
would likely have to remain within the purview of the courts.307 While it is true
that Americans have a strong expectation of privacy in their personal location
data,308 the reasonableness of that belief must be tempered by either a high or
low expectation of privacy.309 It can be extremely high, as with one’s personal
mobile device that is not used for work purposes.310 However, it can also be very
low, as when the device is used primarily for work purposes.311 Americans
cannot expect to retain their privacy rights to the full extent of constitutional
protection when they receive a mobile device from an employer or contract to
have information reviewed by another party.312 The proposed exception would
have to make the delineation between purely personal devices and those that
have a dual-purpose.313 As a correlation, the higher the expectation of privacy in

305 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987) (presuming that a warrant is required,
yet it can be avoided by a showing of probable cause that governmental interests outweigh
the individual’s privacy interest); see also United States v. Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185, 2016
WL 740246, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2016) (stating that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy when a person hands information to a third party).
306 See, e.g., Liming, supra note 223, at 729 (discussing how balancing tests best weigh
the interests of law enforcement and citizens to determine which has the stronger argument
and considering the total reasonableness of the search, courts would be able to determine
whether the obtained information was legitimate).
307 Cf. Baradaran, supra note 10, at 8–9 (2013) (describing “blind balancing” as a judge’s
unbiased balance between privacy rights and societal safety).
308 See Rainie, supra note 58.
309 See id. (reporting 52% of Americans being concerned about government surveillance
of their data).
310 See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608–09 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(discussing how DEA agents used pen registers and CSLI relating to a personal mobile
device to track the whereabouts of a suspect).
311 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 752 (2010) (displaying example of an
individual using a mobile device provided by an employer for uses outside scope of
employment and showing Quon’s presumed low expectation of privacy in work provided
pager through his signed statement of “no expectation of privacy”).
312 See id. at 764 (holding that search of employer provided pager due to employee’s
repeated excessive non-work related text messages was reasonable because pager was
provided for work-related purposes and search was not excessive in scope).
313 Compare Quon, 560 U.S. at 752 (describing employee using employer provided
pager for personal reasons); with United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 614
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that people with personal cell phones are not voluntarily giving
their location data to a third party each time they turn on their smartphone).
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the eyes of the public, the more likely courts would be able to find that obtaining
location data without a warrant constitutes an impermissible search.314
Having the Supreme Court engage in a balancing test between the potential
harm to the public versus the rights of the individual is not a wildly revolutionary
concept.315 It is generally accepted that courts conduct balancing tests to weigh
the safety and welfare of society against the individual’s personal privacy
interests.316 This portion of the test should look very similar to other Fourth
Amendment balancing tests, in that the overall determination concerns when the
public’s welfare and safety becomes threatened at a rate disproportionate to the
individual’s need for privacy.317 When this occurs, obtaining location data
without a warrant may become necessary and expected.318 However, this burden
must be placed on the government and not the individual. The government has
vast resources at its disposal to aid in the apprehension of suspects, and therefore
must show that no other alternative was available.
314 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (stating modern mobile
devices contain more information about a person than what a search of a traditional house
would reveal); Rainie, supra note 58 (reporting 74% of Americans want to be in control of
who has access to their information and 65% want to be able to control what information is
collected by the government). With Americans feeling so strongly about protecting their
privacy, the Court needs to acknowledge that privacy interests have extended beyond the
traditional home search. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding
that people cannot have an expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial on a
phone); see also Rainie, supra note 58 (reporting that over 60% of Americans believe the
government is not doing enough to keep data private); Rosenbaum, supra note 59 (reporting
privacy concerns as cell phone and GPS technology becomes more advanced).
315 Cf. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2478 (2014) (finding information on a cell
phone found on person incident to arrest does not further government interest and does
implicate a “substantially greater” privacy interest than a simple pat down of clothing); City
of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 757 (2010) (stating that a reasonableness standard should
be used when balancing employee privacy rights and work related conduct); United States v.
Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427–28 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (finding that making and receiving
calls and texts on mobile device is like the pen register in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735
(1979) where defendant voluntarily gave information to cell phone carrier towers and
“assumed the risk” of that third party giving the information to the government).
316 David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric
Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1109 (2013) (stating that the circuit courts apply the
Supreme Court of the United States’ Fourth Amendment balancing test between government
interest and individual privacy rights in their decisions); see also United States v. Graham,
824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016); Quon, 560 U.S. at 759–760; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488.
317 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (holding the interests of society can be weighed against
the privacy rights of the individual in an exigent situation); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 657 (1984) (finding that the safety of society outweighed the privacy interest of suspect
when he hid a gun in a supermarket and police asked him where it was before reading his
Miranda rights).
318 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494 (holding that, generally, a warrant is required to search a
cell phone incident to arrest but there may be an exigency situation to justify a warrantless
search of a specific phone).
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2. Overcoming the Presumption of Privacy Inherent in Mobile Device Location
Data
If the government shows there is a low expectation of privacy, intrusion would
be minimal, and potential harm to the public could be great, the presumption
would be rebutted.319 The reason for a rebuttable presumption is that there will
be instances where the government and law enforcement need to protect public
safety in a small window of time.320 As with other exceptions to the warrant
requirement, this exception must be narrowly tailored to specific reasons for
which the government would be able to bypass obtaining a warrant.321 The
government’s strongest argument would come by relying on the third-party
doctrine to differentiate between instances where the police search a mobile
device’s content or force the device to perform, and where location data is
merely obtained from a service provider.322 If it can show that the location data
was obtained similar to a situation like a pen register, there is more legal weight
to the argument.323
While it may seem that creating exceptions to the warrant requirement allow
the government to bypass a constitutional protection, that is not the case.324
There is a reason that exceptions to the warrant requirement are so few and far
between, and the solution posited does not advocate for the weakening of
personal protections. Rather, this exception and test would allow for a judicially
recognized presumption of the individual’s right to privacy in their mobile
device’s location data while also giving the government the opportunity to

319 See Owsley, supra note 9, at 227 (stating that under the third-party doctrine, cell
phone users arguably do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their location data
transmitted from their device).
320 See, e.g., United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015 WL 7758930, at *3–5,
12 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2015) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress cell phone records
because traffic stop and vehicle search uncovering two cell phones were lawful along with
subsequent subpoena for cell phone records, and finding defendant coming under the thirdparty doctrine when using a cell phone and cell carrier to conduct murders).
321 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482, 2494 (holding that a warrant is needed to search a
cell phone incident to arrest, and acknowledging the exceptions that exist to prevent the
destruction of evidence and when a police officer is pursuing a fleeing suspect, assisting
injured persons, or assisting persons threated with imminent injury).
322 THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 11 (stating that the government can obtain data
information from cell carriers under the Smith third-party and assumption of risk doctrines).
Getting the location data from a provider, which would be considered a third-party, would
make the search more like the installation of a pen register than directly tapping a phone.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding that when a phone number is
dialed, the dialer is conveying that information to a third party).
323 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (finding that telephone users must convey the number
they are dialing to a telephone company’s switch board).
324 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 764 (2010) (finding that search did not
become unreasonable when the government obtained information from a third party).
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protect public safety in instances where obtaining a warrant would unfairly
compromise public welfare.325
3. Shaping the New Exception to the Warrant Requirement and a Proffered
Example
The novelty of this solution is that it creates an exception to the warrant
requirement, recognizing the modern-day importance of location data to
Americans while also allowing law enforcement to perform its duty of protecting
citizens.326 Courts need to adhere to the test established by Justice Harlan in
recognizing societal interests in protecting personal data information.327 Yet an
overarching and absolute protection of location data would prejudice law
enforcement’s ability to keep people safe and prevent crime.328 That is why
creating an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement would be
a viable solution to this issue. It would allow for the presumption of societal
interest in protecting location data while also giving police the opportunity to
overcome the presumption in special cases.329
Using a balancing test, courts would be able to determine whether the
government met its burden to overcome the newly recognized protection of
mobile-device location data.330 Take for example the Boston Marathon Bombing
in 2013; had the police been able to dispense of the traditional procedure of
obtaining a warrant, the Tsarnaev brothers, modern-day terrorists, may have

325 See supra Section IV.B.1; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327–28 (1987)
(holding that dispensing of the need for warrants in some circumstances is not the same as
accepting a lesser standard than what a warrant would mandate).
326 United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437–38 (4th Cir. 2016) (affirming the district
court’s holding that the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it acquired
CSLI records from the defendant’s cell phone carrier).
327 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(establishing a two-part test for search in that the first part is a subjective belief of privacy
and the second part is society’s objective belief in recognizing that privacy).
328 See, e.g., Rob Cerullo, GPS Tracking Devices and the Constitution, POLICE CHIEF,
Aug. 2016, at 2 (showing cases where warrantless GPS use by police upheld by courts and
warning against restricting use too much and rendering law enforcement unable to perform
its duties).
329 See supra Section V.B.1–2.
330 See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 10, at 57 (stating that while no balancing test is fair, it
is needed so a judge does not rely merely on her gut intuition). Unlike the “blind balancing”
concept Professor Baradaran advocates against, a proper balancing test in this warrant
requirement exception would eliminate judges considering costs and benefits to parties and
society which lacks relevance and completeness. When applying “blind balancing,” judicial
members are prone to ignoring important evidence which provides context to the individual
case before the bench. Id.

2018]

Privacy vs. Protection

45

been apprehended sooner and lives saved.331 Police could have easily
demonstrated to a court that the government’s interest in protecting the public
from suspected terrorists in this instance far outweighed the Tsarnaevs’ privacy
interest in protecting their location data.332 This type of event would satisfy the
exception.
The purpose of recognizing a new exception to the warrant requirement, and
using a balancing test for that exception, is to provide individualized, case-bycase analysis of Fourth Amendment legal issues in a twenty-first century
world.333 Law enforcement would still be able to obtain a warrant for CSLI and
location data through traditional means. The new exception would simply
provide a vehicle for recognizing public interest in location data privacy, provide
situations where the government could dispense with obtaining a warrant, and
settle the debate over constitutionality of warrantless searches of mobile-device
location data.334
C. Addressing Counterarguments from the Majority of Scholarship
As with any scholarly issue there will be counterarguments to the solution
advocated. With a modern issue like mobile device location data tracking, there
are bound to be strong opinions on both sides of the debate.335 Addressing
331 See generally O’Neill, supra note 69 (showing suspect’s data usage regarding
bombing two months prior to crime).
332 Police could also have provided sufficient need for GPS location data from the
phones due to the ongoing emergency. How GPS Works, GPS.GOV,
http://www.gps.gov/multimedia/poster/ (last modified Sep. 26, 2016).
333 See The Problem with Mobile Phones, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE,
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/problem-mobile-phones (last updated Feb. 10, 2015)
(discussing the surveillance problems associated with the ubiquity of mobile devices being
used a primary means of communication); see also Baradaran, supra note 10, at 57–58
(quoting Professor Baradaran) (“[J]udicial balancing ignores broader evidence the provides
context to the individual case at hand.”). A case-by-case approach would dispose of cases
and issues before courts in a fair and constitutional manner. Id.
334 See Rainie, supra note 58 (presenting data regarding Americans general concerns
about location data privacy). Compare United States v. Ledbetter, No. 2:15-CR-080, 2015
WL 7758930, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2015) (denying defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the government’s use of cell site location information), with In re
Application for Tel. Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011,
1013 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying the government’s application “to obtain historical cell site
location information associated with [Redacted] target cell phones”), and United States v.
Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (granting the defendant’s motion to
suppress evidence recovered by DEA agents use of cell site location), and United States v.
Chavez, No. 3:14-cr-00185(JAM), 2016 WL 740246, at *1 (D. Conn. 2016) (denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence acquired by the government’s use of cell site
location information).
335 See Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 38–41 (recognizing privacy advocates’
increasing concerns with the potential for covert police surveillance of mobile device GPS
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counterarguments against one’s solution while acknowledging potential
weaknesses is a vital step towards furthering theory and debate.
1. Fundamental “American” Rights of Privacy and Security in Oneself and
Possessions
There is a pervasive notion that individual rights and security are an inherently
“American” concept that cannot be encroached upon.336 A large portion of
scholarship supports the view that mobile device location data is the modern
equivalent of one’s essential property and should therefore be protected against
governmental search.337 However, mobile devices are only tools for making life,
arguably, easier; they do not hold the same legal significance as the home or
birth certificate. Unlike one’s wallet or social security card, which can be
zealously guarded and physically protected, mobile device data is sent via cell
towers, uploaded onto social media, downloaded and stored by service
providers, and easily accessible by third parties.338 History has shown that these
rights are curbed against the overall interests of society and the protection of the
Union.339 Therefore, it stands to reason that case law indicating one’s mobile
data and acknowledging that courts have yet to definitively take a stance against the Fourth
Amendment violations such surveillance poses).
336 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (“A double security arises to the
rights of the people . . . It is of great importance in a republic . . . to guard one part of the
society against the injustice of the other part . . . If a majority be united by a common
interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”).
337 Ross Hoogstraten, Implications on the Constitutionality of Student Cell Phone
Searches Following Riley v. California, 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 879, 911 (2016)
(arguing that warrantless searches of cell phones are unreasonable “almost in every context
because of the reasonable expectation of privacy” one has in the data on the device, which
outweighs government concerns); Jordan Miller, New Age Tracking Technologies in the
Post-United States v. Jones Environment: The Need for Model Legislation, 48 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 553, 603 (2015) (arguing that the best way to protect individuals from wide-ranging
government searches is “to adopt comprehensive legislation . . . able to predict the future
developments of technology . . . as technology advances in the field of tracking searches.”).
338 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 61, at 2–4 (explaining how mobile devices and the
information stored within them can be accessed by anyone with the devices’ unlocking
combination or password to personal websites, whereas a wallet and social security card
must physically be taken in order to be used by another person); THOMPSON, supra note 11,
at 7 (discussing the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and “government access to
records and other information held by third parties”).
339 Marc McAllister, GPS and Cell Phone Tracking: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 235 (2013) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court has
reasoned that a “search” considers whether “society is prepared to recognize [a defendant’s
asserted expectation of privacy] as reasonable which shows that consideration of individual
interests against government searches turns on whether society believes that the individual
should be free from such searches.” Protecting the interests of society comes before the
interests of the individual when the individual’s interest would harm society).
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device is not necessarily his or her “castle” may be in line with historical Fourth
Amendment analysis.340
Another line of argument for requiring location data to be obtained only
through a warrant is that Riley v. California should be read broadly, extending
well beyond the search-incident-to-arrest exception.341 The basis for this claim
is the belief that the Court in Riley created a per se rule that requires a warrant
every time content is accessed on mobile devices.342 In his argument, one author
states, “Many of the cases taking a narrow view of Riley ignore the vast storage
capacity that cell phones have, frustrating the qualitative differences that the
Court saw between these devices and other articles.”343 However, this argument
fails to consider the fact that Riley was a unanimous decision from the Court.344
This is a feat that would arguably have been impossible to attain if the ruling
were to be read broadly as applying to almost any situation involving mobile
devices.
The “Conservative Wing,” for example, would be very unlikely to vote for a
consistently broad interpretation that does not consider every applicable
factor.345 Broadly interpreting the decision, as pointed out, would suffer the same
flaws as narrowly interpreting the decision.346 Yet, it would also create an
expansive interpretation beyond the Court’s holding. 347 Weight must be given
to the Court refusing to specifically address the privacy protections inherent in
location data and CSLI in Riley, a fact tending to caution against broad
application of the holding.348 Besides the above mentioned counter arguments,
a substantial amount of scholarship claims that the only reason warrantless
location data tracking is considered constitutional is because of surveillance
340 See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 781 (6th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that since
GPS data is inherently included in the communicative feature of mobile devices, and users
know that such communications are not private, the defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his location data).
341 Bryan Sandford, A Castle in the Sky: GPS Tracking of a Defendant’s Cell Phone
Post–Riley v. California, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 907, 938 (2015) (arguing that reading Riley’s
holding narrowly “ignores the plain language of the decision and frustrates the underlying
policy articulated by the Court.”).
342 See id. at 909–10 (arguing that the Court’s recent decisions support a per se rule
which would require courts to apply every warrant requirement exception to see if any fit,
before allowing the police to obtain data without a warrant).
343 Id. at 922.
344 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2014).
345 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987) (stating that overly-broad holdings
would jeopardize doctrinal theories protecting the authority of police to make warrantless
searches and seizures in public places).
346 Sandford, supra note 341, at 938.
347 See LaChance, supra note 8 (arguing that a warrant is still necessary regardless of cell
phones’ technological advances and efficiencies).
348 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2480, 2490, 2492, 2494 (2014) (addressing the
important role cell phone location data can play in proving an individual’s guilt).
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statues enacted by Congress.349
2. Congressionally Enacted Surveillance Statutes Provide the Only
Justification to Warrantless Location Data Tracking Being Considered
Constitutional
Some academics have claimed that the constitutionality of location data
tracking without a warrant is doubtful at best, and the legal basis can only be
found in surveillance statutes.350 Such statutes are binding law, and when
consumers willingly leave their location tracking apps open on their mobile
devices, they are put on notice as to the ramifications. 351 If citizens do not want
their locations tracked via GPS, they only have to disable GPS capabilities of
their mobile devices. A counter to that reasoning is that misinterpretation of
landmark Supreme Court Fourth Amendment decisions risks eroding civil
liberties.352 Claiming that since the public does not favor a “surveillance state”
the Court must follow public opinion misinterprets the American system’s
foundation upon checks and balances between coequal branches of
government.353
Americans expect the freedom to move about in relative anonymity, without
the government keeping an individualized itinerary of their comings and

See infra Section IV.C.2.
See Ian James Samuel, Warrantless Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324,
1351 (2008) (“[T]he ‘right to be let alone’ does not mean much if, thanks to the vicarious
presence of the state in one’s phone, solitude is an illusion.”); see also Nathaniel Wackman,
Historical Cellular Location Information and the Fourth Amendment, 2015 U. ILL. REV.
263, 315, 318 (2015) (recognizing that Congress has legislated the Stored Communications
Act to regulate such searches, and advocates for amendments to include suppression
remedies for location data seized).
351 The age-old legal doctrine that ignorance of the law is no excuse proves telling in this
instance because consumers are given ample opportunity to decline third-party tracking and
data sharing when they are given the choice of downloading and using a program, app or
website. See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Common Law, U. OF TORONTO L. SCH. 1, 45,
52 (2011) (“Ignorance of a fact and inability to foresee a consequence have the same effect
on blameworthiness.”).
352 See Tim Sheehan, Taking the Third-Party Doctrine Too Far, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 181, 182 (2015) (claiming that public opinion at this time is “firmly in favor of
curtailing, not enlarging, the surveillance state.”).
353 See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 10, at 49–50 (stating that the judicial branch of
government is supposed to be above the public’s influence; it cannot issue effective legal
decisions if it is beholden to public whims); Sheehan, supra note 352, at 182 (explaining
that the Supreme Court has never sought to issue a clear ruling on this topic, even though
those arguing for a straight ban on compelling location data without a warrant would lead
readers to believe that there is binding precedent supporting requiring a warrant in such
circumstances).
349
350
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goings.354 Latching onto this concept, an argument has been made that the
constitutionality of warrantless tracking should depend upon the nature of the
crime being investigated.355 Not only is this discrimination against certain
classes of crimes, it would most likely constitute extreme selectivity of crimes
that would be rebuked by courts and legislatures alike.356 Applying selective
standards would be a step in the wrong direction and would only lead to more
confusion for law enforcement and courts reviewing the actions of those law
enforcement officers.
One of the most common counterarguments is that the ubiquitous nature of
mobile devices and technology in American society has created a new
expectation of privacy in such property.357 Yes, technological advances can
create modernized expectations of privacy. However, in a technological age it is
also important to adapt the legal protections afforded to law enforcement.358
Modern mobile devices allow those seeking to break the law to look up the
locations they plan to visit, communicate GPS coordinates and roadmaps, hack

354 See Renee M. Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 455 (2007) (“[C]itizens of this country largely expect
the freedom to move about in relative anonymity without the government keeping an
individualized, turn-by-turn itinerary of our comings and goings.”). This point aligns with
the solution posited in this Note that there is a need for a test differentiating when the
freedom to move about should be protected and when it is heavily outweighed by the public
interest because public opinion is only one factor considered for whether privacy
expectations are reasonable and must be weighed against the potential harm to society. See
supra Section IV.B.
355 McAllister, supra note 339, at 250–53 (delineating three categories of individuals and
standards to be applied: “Those Suspected of Severe Crimes,” “Those Suspected of Minor
Crimes,” and “Those Not Suspected of Any Crime”); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley
Search Warrant: Search Protocols and Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L.
REV. 585, 638 (2016) (arguing that “magistrates should not authorize police to. . . download
and comb through millions of pages of data that is unrelated to the crime being
investigated.”).
356 On top of that legal issue, there is the assumption that such a selective and
discriminatory test would enrage the populace and receive little to no support from
Congress. See McAllister, supra note 339, at 246–50 (analyzing public survey results and
recent congressional and judicial decisions to prove a general societal preference to limit the
government’s ability to obtain cell phone information from individuals without a warrant).
357 Owsley, supra note 9, at 230; see, e.g., Freiwald, supra note 10, at 748–49 (stating
that a probable cause standard which requires notifying the target and providing meaningful
remedies would make a significant difference in protecting individuals privacy rights from
“government compulsion of disclosure of location data”); see also Suuberg, supra note 12,
at 330 (pointing to the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s summary of a Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning in a privacy protection case as being a harmful denial of “an expectation of
privacy in cell phones.”).
358 See Freiwald, supra note 10, at 725 (stating that “Location data has furnished law
enforcement with investigatory and prosecutorial value in the past several years.”); Cerullo,
supra note 328, at 2 (“Advanced technology greatly enhances a police officer’s ability to
fight crime.”).
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into users’ bank accounts and social media sites, and countless other illegal
acts.359 Not allowing law enforcement, under specific conditions, to access the
information on those devices would lead to a gross imbalance of power between
lawbreakers and the men and women whose duty it is to prevent violations of
the law.360 It would harm society to hamstring the police by forcing them into
using outdated technology and methods to find and track suspects.361
Modern technology must be allowed to progress, and law enforcement must
be able to similarly adapt.362 Arguments will inevitably be raised against this
proposed solution; however, the fundamental issue of how to balance law
enforcement’s needs and societal interests remains.363 Merely stating that there
is a problem, and that it needs fixed, will not bring about change.364 Change can
only come from educated discourse, on both sides of the issue, leading to a
refined and balanced solution.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court must act sooner, rather than later, in taking
up a litmus test case that will set new precedent for upcoming mobile device
location tracking jurisprudence. By forming a new exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, the Court will craft a more comprehensive
and applicable standard for the inevitable rise in electronic-mobile cases.365 It is
not enough to broadly hold that law enforcement’s obtaining of location tracking
data from service providers is not a breach of the Fourth Amendment because
that would be a travesty to the rights and freedoms protected under the
Amendment.366 A test establishing factors relevant to a constitutional analysis
will enable courts to protect against unwarranted searches at the same time as
protecting individual privacy interests.367 Additionally, the test will give courts
flexibility to weigh the interests of the public against the individual’s right to
privacy, and in certain cases to uphold law enforcement’s use of location data
Van Ells, supra note 24.
See supra Section IV.B.
361 See Cerullo, supra note 328, at 2 (noting that America cannot have it both ways: To
be protected from modern crime, and to push law enforcement and government out of
citizens’ location data completely); see also Dolan, Lennon & Munoz, supra note 9, at 39–
41 (highlighting cases wherein modern GPS tracking data has assisted investigators in
solving cases by accurately tracing the locations of criminals).
362 See supra Section I.B.3.
363 See supra Section IV.B.1–3.
364 See supra Section IV.A-C.
365 See supra Section IV.B.3.
366 See supra Section IV.B.1.
367 See supra Section IV.B.3.
359
360
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obtained without a warrant.368
As America continually progresses into a more technologically advanced
nation, the problem of law enforcement, and the government, using electronic
location data to track suspects will only continue to fester.369 With the advent of
even more advanced technology, Americans will immerse themselves to a
greater degree into the electronic mobile world. The legal field needs to be ready
to adapt to that new reality and recognize the inherent expectation of privacy in
mobile-device location data.370 Without comprehensive and modernized mobile
device jurisprudence, the risk of constitutional rights being trampled will only
multiply.371

368
369
370
371

See supra Section IV.B.3.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra Part III.
See supra Sections IV.A-C.
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